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Urban Renewal: Laissez-Faire for the Poor,
Welfare for the Richt

SONYA BEKOFF MOLHO*
GIDEON KANNER**

Findingblight merely means defining a neighborhood that cannot
effectively fight back, but which is either an eyesore or is welllocated for some particularconstruction that important interests
wish to build. . . . Urban renewal1 takes sides; it uproots and
evicts some for the benefit of others.
Hailed as a "necessary concomitant of urban civilization," 2 urban renewal is big business. Small communities tackle million-dollar projects, 3 and
moderately sized cities scramble to build $60 and $70 million shopping
4
centers as central business district "redevelopment" projects. The redet This article was prepared under a Summer 1976 Law and Liberty Project Fellowship
Grant awarded by the Institute for Human Studies, Menlo Park, California.
* B.A., California State University, Northridge; J.D., Loyola University School of
Law, Los Angeles.
** B.M.E., The Cooper Union; J.D., University of Southern California; Acting Professor
of Law, Loyola University School of Law, Los Angeles.
1. L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING (1968), quoted in C. HARTMAN,
YERBA BUENA:

LAND GRAB AND COMMUNITY RESISTANCE IN SAN FRANCISCO 13

(1974)

[hereinafter cited as HARTMAN].
2. Walker, A New PatternFor Urban Renewal, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 633 (1960).
3.

C.G. LINDBLOOM & M. FARRAH, THE CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO URBAN RENEWAL 17 (rev.

ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as LINDBLOOM & FARRAH].
4. Santa Monica and Culver City are next-door neighbors in Southern California. Both
are cities of moderate size. As one of several "redevelopment projects" in the area, Culver
City built Fox Hills Mall, a $70 million triple-level, enclosed shopping mall containing three
major department stores, 131 shops, and one savings and loan institution. Fox Hills Mall
opened in early October 1975. Santa Monica, fearing it would lose shoppers and the concomitant sales tax revenues, as its residents streamed to the new retail center, rushed to push its own
shopping center-redevelopment project through the maze of governmental regulations. Early
estimates of the Santa Monica project indicate it will cost approximately $60 million, but this
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velopment agencies, often composed of the local city council sitting under a
different name, promise revitalized cities with brand-new, more convenient
shopping centers, new tourist centers to lure more visitors to the city, luxury
housing units, and whatever else can be envisioned as an enhancement of
the local tax base. But best of all, the agencies promise to accomplish these
5
wonders without the use of taxpayer money.
Of course, cities cannot be rebuilt without incurring costs. In fact, billions
of dollars have been spent on urban renewal; 6 one way or another, the
taxpayers pay. There is no such thing as a free lunch; the question is who
picks up the tab.
The out-of-pocket expenses of the taxpayers, usually seen in the form of
higher property taxes as redevelopment projects disappear from property tax
rolls, 7 are not the only costs of urban renewal. There are other, less obvious,
costs, most notably those suffered by the persons who are displaced from
their homes and businesses when an area is "renewed." Often members of
the lower or lower-middle income classes, the displaced population lacks
the political clout to secure redress of its grievances8 and is forced from its
amount may increase due to changes in the project, increased building costs, and other factors.
See notes 160-196 infra and accompanying text.
5. For example, Santa Monica's mayor stated that the proposed downtown central
business district project, see note 4 supra, "is vital to the city's future and will not require the
use of Santa Monica taxpayer money." L.A. Times (West Side), Jan. 29, 1976, §8, col. 1, at I.
Santa Monica plans to pay for the project through lease-revenue bonds and tax increment
financing. Justice Herman, until his death in 1971 the head of the San Francisco Redevelopment
Agency, regarded federal urban renewal grants as "free" money and so managed affairs that
the city never had to put its own cash directly into its renewal program. HARTMAN, supra note 1,
at 160.
6. As of 1961, some $6 billion in public funds had already been earmarked for projects
under the federal urban renewal program, whose proponents believed that private developers
must be provided with large areas of urban land at low cost. M. ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL
BULLDOZER 141-42 (McGraw-Hill paperback ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON]. The
Federal Housing Administration incurred subsidy cost obligations of $16.5 billion in trying to
provide "a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family" under the
urban renewal program and succeeded only in exacerbating the housing dilemma of the urban
poor. Hirshen & LeGates, Neglected Dimensions in Low-Income Housing and Development
Programs. 9 URB. L. ANN. 3, 6 (1975).
7. Los Angeles County Tax Assessor Philip E. Watson states that redevelopment makes
additional improvements to the land within a project area (e.g., a shopping center) tax exampt
insofar as the original taxing jurisdictions are concerned. Gardena Valley News, Dec. 5, 1974,
at 1, col. 4. Although land within the redevelopment project areas is supposed to return to the
county tax rolls after the project's bonds are paid off, no Los Angeles redevelopment project
since 1958 has so returned. Instead, the redevelopment agencies capture the incremental
property taxes indefinitely. An accountant in the Los Angeles County Office of AuditorController states that not only are there no time estimates for completion of a redevelopment
project-of less than 25 years, but that some estimates report that project-created tax increments
will be diverted to the redevelopment agencies for up to 45 years. Gardena Valley News, Dec.
5, 1974, at 2, col. 6. Obviously, the remaining taxpayers of the taxing entity must make up for
the deficit caused by the diversion of incremental tax funds into redevelopment projects.
8. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the EthicalFoundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1254-55 (1967):
When land is appropriated for clearance and redevelopment, its owner is, of course,
compensated in the amount of its 'fair market value.' But, by the generally received
doctrines, tenants are not congtitutionally entitled to anything (unless nonsalvageable tenant-owned fixtures are destroyed), and tenant-owners are not constitutionally entitled to be compensated for the disruptive effects of changing neighborhoods and sinking new roots, or even, in case a business is uprooted, for good will
destroyed, or, very possibly, for the cash outlay entailed in moving. Justification is
not hard to come by for judicial abstinence from such claims. Valuation of good will
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land in the name of "progress." 9
The financial consequences of displacement-losses caused by moving
expenses; relocation costs incident to finding a new dwelling or shop; and
replacement costs in terms of rent, purchase price, or mortgage paymentshave serious social and psychological effects upon the nature and quality of
the life of a displaced family or individual. 10 Historically, these costs have
been inadequately compensated, or not compensated at all," on a variety of
judicial rationales that do not withstand analysis.
The backbone of the urban renewal program is the power of eminent
domain, an inherent power of the state. Since they are creatures of the
state, 12 the local redevelopment agencies may condemn property where
owners are unwilling to sell. This enables a developer to more efficiently
assemble blocks of land held by multiple owners, and at a lower cost than if
is a formidable problem. How far away is a person 'entitled' to move? How do you
translate into dollars the shock of changing neighborhoods and the damnable
inconvenience of moving, or appraise the educational damage inflicted by midstream
changes in schools? All these problems are multiplied a hundred or a thousandfold
where large scale programs scatter large numbers of families. The imponderable and
idiosyncratic nature of the losses involved, and the interminable wrangling over
amounts which would result from imposing a legal requirement of 'just comjiensation,' furnish a classic instance in which compensation claims are defeated largely
because of sheer impenetrability.
Yet the violent unfairness of many such operations is manifest . . . . Easily
identified, relatively small numbers of people are being handed a distinctly disproportionate and frequently excruciating share of the cost of whatever social gain is
involved . . . .Those dislocated are likely to be members, of a social class which
comes increasingly to be identified as a faction-'the urban poor.' Yet their influence
and organization is not so great, certainly less than their numbers might indicate...
Altogether, the spectacle of uncompensated dislocations under these circumstances
is an oppressive one.
With all due respect to Professor Michelman's lucid recitation of this judicially enshrined
conventional wisdom, the fact is that similar and even more tenuous claims are daily faced and
converted into dollars in the context of tort and commercial litigation, without anyone seriously
purporting to be bewildered by their supposed "impenetrability."
9. E.g., County of Los Angeles v. Anthony, 224 Cal. App. 2d 103, 36 Cal. Rptr. 308
(1964), in which the court validated the taking and razing of the Anthony home in order that a
private, profit-making motion picture and television museum might be built on the spot. The
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors voted $1,000,000 to build the proposed museum.
Although they actually spent $1,600,000, it is unclear where the money went since the site of the
former Anthony home is now, and has been for many years, an occasionally-used parking lot.
Interview with Steve Anthony, Grass Roots Forum, Aug. 17, 1968, vol. 2, no. 6, at 7. Mr.
Anthony only received $11,750.00 for his one-half interest in the property. County of Los
Angeles v. Anthony, 224 Cal App. 2d 103, 104, 36 Cal. Rptr. 308, 309 (1964).
10. LINDBLOOM & FARRAH, supra note 3, at 109-10, candidly admit that the relocation
caused by urban renewal brings losses for which money cannot pay. See also Millspaugh,
Problems and Opportunitiesof Relocation, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 6 (1961); Fried, Grieving
for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation (1963), in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD
AND THE CONTROVERSY 359 (J. Wilson ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Fried in WILSON);
Hartman, The Housing of Relocated Families, 30 J.AM. INST. PLANNERS 266 (1964), in URBAN
RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 293 (J. Wilson ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as
Hartman in WILSON]; Zimmer, The Small Businessman and Relocation (1964), in URBAN
RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 380 (J. Wilson ed. 1966); Klein, Eminent
Domain:JudicialResponse to the Human Disruption, 46 J. URB. L. 1 (1968); Note, The Interest
in Rootedness: Family Relocation and an Approach to Full Indemnity, 21 STAN. L. REV. 801
(1969).
11. See text accompanying notes 188-225 infra.
12. Gibbs v. City of Napa, 59 Cal. App. 3d 148, 154, 130 Cal. Rptr. 382, 385 (1976). This,
of course, is sheer semantic legerdemain. Redevelopment agencies-at least in California- are
purely local creatures, run by and serving local interests. They are in no way responsiveadministratively, financially, or politically-to any state agency.
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the developer had to negotiate with the owners on an individual basis and
deal with holdouts. Theoretically, there might seem to be justification for
such use of the condemnation power, provided one were indeed dealing with
slum clearance. 13 However, land which is neither blighted 14 nor slum
property is often condemned and sold to a favored private developer at a
discount, thus subsidizing such developers at the expense of all other
members of society.
It is not the purpose of this paper to explore the inadequacies of eminent
domain law in general, a field aptly characterized as "a maniacal backwash
of American law whose rites are performed by appropriately type-cast
acolytes," 15 and "a mass of obtuse decisional law that is only occasionally
relieved by judicial common sense, pragmatism and candor." 16 Rather, this
article contends that in an area already notorious for harshness and draconically unfair rules, some of the worst and least justifiable hardships are
visited upon the victims of the urban renewal program.
URBAN RENEWAL IN A NUTSHELL

A.

The Urban Renewal Process

Urban renewal refers to the acquisition by a municipal agency, usually the
local redevelopment agency, of property which is cleared and redeveloped
by the condemning agency or by private individuals to whom the land is
sold. 17 As an incentive to attract private developers, the cleared land is
generally sold for about 30 percent of the city's cost to acquire, clear, and
improve the site. 1 The difference between the cost to prepare the land and
the amount the developer pays is the land "write-down." Under the federal
urban renewal program, now largely defunct except for unfinished projects,
the federal government paid two-thirds to three-fourths of the write-down
cost. This money was regarded as "free" by the redevelopment agencies
and cities, 19 although obviously subsidized by taxpayers across the country.
The remaining one-fourth to one-third of the write-down cost, the local
share, was provided as a simple cash payment or in credit for certain types
of work performed by the municipality. By paying for all or part of the local
13. Slum clearance is no longer the aim of the urban renewal program. See text accompanying notes 43-52 infra.
14. At least the land is not "blighted" in any sense that this word might have meaning to

an intelligent, well-educated, English-speaking person, untutored in the arcane doubletalk of
redevelopment law. But see Sweetwater Valley Civic Ass'n v. City of National City, 18 Cal. 3d
270, 555 P.2d 1099, 133 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1976).
15. Lascher, Lascher at Large, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 38 (1975).

16. Van Alstyne, ModernizingInverse Condemnation:A Legislative Prospectus, 8 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 1, 4 (1967). For a collection of further excoriations, see Kanner, When is
"Property" Not "PropertyItself": A CriticalExaminationof the Bases of Denialof Compensation for Loss of Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6 CAL. W.L. REv. 57, 58 (1969).
17. 2A P. NICHOLS, NicHoLs ON EMINENT DOMAIN §7.51561 (3d rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter

cited as NIcHOLS].
18. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 2-3.
19. See note 5 supra.
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share in credits, such, as public improvements which benefit the renewal
project area, the municipality could use urban renewal projects to create
capital improvements which it would have had to make anyway. Not only
could the availability of such credits for municipal improvements make the
difference in the community's financial ability to undertake a renewal
project, but projects were started principally to capture the credit for some
improvement, such as a school, which the municipality had built for nonurban renewal reasons. Should the improvements (streets, sewers, parks,
landscaping, schools, district fire and police stations, off-street parking
facilities, etc.) in a project area cost more than the city needed to spend as its
share for that particular project, the excess amount that the city had spent
over the required amount was carried over as a credit to help pay for the
local share of subsequent urban renewal projects .20 The ability to carry over
credits from one project to another plus the easy availability of federal funds
encouraged the cities to take on multiple projects, creating an intricate web
as credits and projects were shuffled in a never-ending shell game.
Even before the federal categorical grants for urban renewal ended, some
states such as California began using another method of financing redevelopment projects. This technique makes use of lease-revenue bonds to pay
for construction and other development costs. The redevelopment agency
condemns the project site, public facilities are built, and the sites and
facilities are then leased to the city for a rent sufficient to amortize the bonds
and cover the agency's additional expenses. The bonds are supposed to be
paid off after a stipulated length of time, at which point title to the public
facilities transfers to the city. 2 1 This financing agreement obligates the city
to pay the stipulated rent (i.e., full debt repayment costs) and other unexpected costs to the redevelopment agency, regardless of whether or not the
projected revenues from the rented facilities meet the amount of the rent.
The central component of this financing plan is the property tax increment. Through the use of tax increment financing, the assessed value of the
property is frozen; future increases in property taxes caused by improvements built on the project site are siphoned off by the redevelopment
agency. 22 The redevelopment agency need not be responsible for the improvement or the increase in property taxes in order to receive the increment
20. LINDBLOOM & FARRAH, supra note 3, at 136-46.
21. This method was adopted as part of the CAL. CONST. art. XVI, §16, adopted Nov. 5,
1974. But according to Los Angeles County Assessor Watson, "Only one out of all the

[redevelopment] agencies created in Los Angeles County has ever completed its project or paid

off its bonds. Routinely the agencies just expand their project areas and sell more bonds:"
Watson, Downtown CRA Called 'RadicalMasectomy' [sic], L.A. Daily S., May 25, 1976, at 3,

col. 7. Currently, the county assessor estimates that about 40 percent of Los Angeles County's

land is exempt from property taxes because it is owned by government agencies. The Los

Angeles Redevelopment Agency has developed about 43 percent of its project area, but it is
constantly seeking to enlarge its domain. L.A. Daily S., June 28, 1976, at 1, col. 4.
22. See generally Hegg, Tax-Increment Financing of Urban Renewal-Redevelopment
Incentive Without FederalAssistance, 2 REAL ESrATE L.J. 575 (1973).
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generated. Additionally, increments generated by normal increase in value
of the land because of inflation accrue to the redevelopment agency as well.
This scheme works if the shopping center, office buildings, or other
improvement on the project site is an economic success, but if the tax
increment is not sufficient to pay the bonded indebtedness, the city has to
make up the deficit out of its general revenues. In Redondo Beach, California, for example, the city wound up paying $520,000 per year from its
municipal revenues to make up the difference between its redevelopment
project's tax increment income and the principal and interest payments on
parking lot bonds.23
In California, redevelopment agencies are not restricted to building only
within a project area, 24 but have the option of building any type of public
improvement anywhere in the city. Redevelopment agencies therefore often
use tax increment income to build municipal improvements, such as city
halls,25 auditoriums, and stadia. The city is deemed to have somehow
"earned" the tax increment, which it then spends as it chooses. For
example, in the City of Industry, California, the redevelopment agency was
restricted to spending all of its tax revenue funds for retirement of old
redevelopment debts. To restructure its debt, it sold $84 million in new
bonds, thus enabling the agency to thereafter spend excess tax revenues for
26
other purposes.
The use of the redevelopment process to build a city hall or a new
shopping center is thus not accomplished without cost to the taxpayers.
Instead of paying directly for the city hall or shopping center, the taxpayers
pay indirectly-in the form of higher taxes to the school district, the county,
and other taxing entities which lost part of their tax base to the redevelopment agency. Redevelopment is thus essentially a cost-shifting device, with
the affected taxing agencies forced to pay for the construction of the new
improvement.2 7 Of course, a school district may encompass more taxpayers
23. P. WALLIN & C. E. DILKES, REDEVELOPMENT INCALIFORNIA. COMMENTS ON THE NEED
FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 14-15 (1976) [hereinafter cited as WALLIN & DILKES].
24. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§33421, 33445.
25. In Inglewood, the city used tax increment financing to build a new civic center laced
with elevated walkways and punctuated by fountains. L.A. Times, Jan. 23, 1977, §2, at 6, col. 1.
Inglewood's gift to itself is to some extent paid for by all the county's taxpayers. See text
accompanying notes 25-26 infra.
26. City of Industry Ready to Sell $84 Million in Ponds, L.A. Times, June 15, 1975, §S, at
6. The "excess" funds were then used to build a new city hall and fire station.
27. In Los Angeles County in fiscal year 1975-76, $55,877,334.74 was impounded from
other taxing entities and turned over to the community redevelopment agencies. The breakdown of the percentage contributed by each taxing entity is as follows: cities, 9.63% or

$5,383,653.45; Los Angeles County General Fund, 35.11% or $19,618,603.20; school districts,
41.91% or $23,418,821.11; community college districts, 5.52% or $3,084,164.43; consolidated

fire, 2.36% or $1,316,991.64; flood control, 2.07% or $1,155,235.15; metropolitan water district,

1.29% or $718,665.15; all other agencies, 2.11% or $1,181,200.61. L.A. COUNTY AUDITORCONTROLLER, TAX DIVISION, COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT AGENCIES, SCHEDULE OF TAX INCREMENTS, FISCAL YEAR 1975-76.
In 1976, it was estimated that as much as $90 million might be diverted to community
redevelopment agencies in Los Angeles County. Interview with John Eliopoulos, Director,
Assessment Standards, Office of Los Angeles County Assessor, Aug. 9, 1976. An accountant in
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than does the benefited city so as to those taxpayers outside the city, the
redevelopment process also functions as a cost-spreading mechanism. But
when the tax base on a county-wide basis is considered, it becomes obvious
that people who live outside the city are forced to pay for a new city hall
which does not serve them. They are thus assessed for a non-existent ben28
efit.
Should the tax increment revenues exceed the amount needed to pay off
the bonded indebtedness of a project, one would expect the extra revenues to
be returned to the original taxing entity (e.g., the school district). In
practice, however, this does not happen. Instead, the excess revenues are
retained by the redevelopment agency and carried over in the same manner
assuring the continuation of the redevelopment
as non-cash credits, thus
29
sites.
other
on
process
No matter how a city may finance its renewal programs, they cost the
city's taxpayers to the extent of the city's share of the net project cost. Even
where the project does not require cash contributions under the federal
program, the city must make public improvements in the project area. To
the extent that the city has to forego public improvements in other parts of
the city to comply with this requirement, one neighborhood is benefited at
the expense of another, and of course all the city's taxpayers pay for the
particular improvement in the form of taxes.
The theory behind tax increment financing is that once the project site is
improved by the addition of new revenue sources (e.g., a shopping center),
the increase in valuation of the site can be taxed. This incremental tax
revenue is then used to pay off the bonds floated to construct the public
improvements, and the project essentially pays for itself. However, as
pointed out earlier, if the project fails financially, the city must turn to its
future municipal revenues to pay off the bonds.
the county auditor-controller's tax division-predicts that the sum paid.out of county tax revenue
for redevelopment projects "will easily surpass $100 million" next year. L.A. Times, Jan. 23,
1977, §2, at 1, col. 4. This annual sum is expected to grow rapidly in the future.

28. One wonders how much the city's own taxpayers are benefited by the new city hall,
and whether they would have chosen to fund such an expenditure had they had the opportunity
to vote on it. One further reason-and a most important one-for using the redevelopment

process is to avoid financing through a general obligation bond issue which by California law
must receive a two-thirds approval from the voters. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, §18, adopted Nov. 5,
1974. In the past, voters have shown a marked tendency to vote down such measures, and the

courts have shown some inclination to respect the voters' feelings. See, e.g., City of Los
Angeles v. Layton, 269 Cal. App. 2d 567, 75 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1969). L.A. Times, Mar. 17, 1977,
§2, at 1, col. 5:
29. Los Angeles redevelopment officials Wednesday proposed returning $43 million
in tax increment funds produced by the downtown Bunker Hill urban renewal project
to the county's regular taxing agencies within 10 years.

At the same time, the city's Community Redevelopment Agency suggested investing $40 million-also from tax increment revenues-to provide up to 6,000 new and
rehabilitated housing units downtown or in other sections of the city. . ..
The Bunker Hill project was approved by the Los Angeles City Council in 1959. Id. at 2, col.

1. Completion is tentatively scheduled for 1986. Id.
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The inequity of tax increment financing is that once the property tax base
within the limits of the project area is frozen, the revenues from that area
payable to the city, to the county, to the municipal water district, and to all
other taxing jurisdictions remain fixed. Meanwhile the cost of providing
services to the project area rises, fueled by growth of the area and by
inflation. The project area does not generate increased taxes for several
years, 30 and even when the development is completed and is a success, the
increased tax revenues are captured by the redevelopment agency. The
increased tax revenues generated by an urban renewal project, if any, do not
translate into reduced taxes for the rest of the taxpayers. Instead, the
taxpayers are caught between higher costs of services needed by the redevelopment area and fewer taxpayers to share the burden since the redevelopment project is essentially off the tax rolls. Needless to say, the result is
sharply increased taxes for the remaining taxpayers.
Once the land is acquired, the necessary demolition of existing structures
is accomplished, and the public improvements are made, the land is offered
for sale to developers. 3 1 The developer's task is to replace the razed buildings with new edifices. In the process, the developer generally chooses a
more intensive use for the land than it formerly enjoyed, and the city-in its
capacity as land use regulator-is provided with a powerful self-serving
incentive to approve such land use. For example, in California, areas of
low-rent housing are typically replaced with expensive high density highrise apartments, office buildings, industrial parks, or retail shopping centers.32 In the planners' jargon, this is putting the land to a "higher and better
use. "
One of the most important-but least funded-aspects of the redevelopment process is the relocation of the people who are dispersed from the
project area when their homes and businesses turn into rubble. Title I of the
National Housing Act of 1949 mandated that a redevelopment agency have a
"feasible method" for relocating these persons. 33 Because they generally
have a low or moderate income, the displaced persons must move out of the
project area; they may not be able to move back into the area even when new
34
residential units are built.
30. It takes several years to plan and execute a renewal project, during which time it does
not bring in any revenue. Under the federal urban renewal program, the average time needed to
plan and execute a project was around 12 years. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 73-90.
31. It sometimes happens that the developer is chosen first. At least one court has
validated this procedure. See Yonkers Community Dev. Agency v. Morris, 45 App. Div. 2d
889, 357 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1974); affirmed, 37 N.Y.2d 478, 335 N.E.2d 327, 373 N.Y.S.2d 112

(1975).

32. See generally WALLIN & DILKES, supra note 23.
33. 42 U.S.C. §1455(c) (1970).

34. See, e.g., Lublin, Tenants'Revolt Hits A Luxury High Rise; Target is FHA, Wall St.
J., Aug. 13, 1969, at 12, col. 2, reporting that affluent tenants in Washington, D.C. (income
range $10,000-$40,000) revolted against excessive rents charged for apartments built on the site
of the southwest Washington urban renewal project which gave rise to Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954), and signaled the effective demise of the "public use" limitation on takings by
eminent dnmain.
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Before the land can be condemned for renewal purposes, the redevelopment agency must make a finding that the land is either blighted or a slum. If
the land is blighted or slum property, housing is automatically presumed to
be "substandard"; these presumptions are almost impossible to challenge in
the courts. 35 Yet property may be taken for redevelopment purposes, even
though its condition may be innocuous and unoffending, if the agency
decides the area as a whole needs to be "redeveloped.' '36 In plain English,
this means that perfectly satisfactory and badly needed low-cost housing
which may lack amenities in the eyes of middle-class planners can be
condemned and bulldozed. The people who live in such dwellings must find
other housing. They may have been paying all they could afford to pay
before relocation. Once all or part of the low-cost housing units in an area
disappear, owners of surrounding low-cost units raise their rents in response
to the increased demand. The displaced persons therefore not only lose their
homes, but generally wind up paying increased rents for housing of the same
or lower quality than that which they lost.
The redevelopment agency has a federally-mandated obligation to relocate displaced persons in decent, safe and sanitary housing at rents they can
afford and in convenient locations. 37 But if such standard housing units are
available, should not these persons move on their own, without the necessity
38
of having the redevelopment agency force them out of their former homes ?
Once the residents of the project area are displaced, and their homes and
businesses leveled, they may attempt to secure compensation for their
losses, only to find the courts will only inadequately compensate them-if at
all-for business losses, 39 moving expenses, and other incidental expenses
35. But see Sweetwater Valley Civic Ass'n v. City of National City, 18 Cal. 3d 270, 555
P.2d 1099, 133 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1976) where the California Supreme Court held that a redevelopment agency's finding of blight is not conclusive. Id. at 276, 555 P.2d at 1102, 133 Cal. Rptr. at

862.

36. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954).
37. The National Housing Act of 1949 set a national goal of providing "a decent home and

a suitable living environment for every American family." 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970). It is an
apparent federal requirement that safe, decent, and sanitary housing be made available to

persons displaced by urban renewal. In practice, however, it is not unknown for redevelopment
agencies to exert such physical and psychological pressure on residents of a redevelopment
area that the victims are simply forced out of their homes and left to shift for themselves. For a

grim account of one redevelopment agency's activities, see HARTMAN, supra note I, at 123-57.
For a more sympathetic account of a redevelopment agency which, according to its director,
generally tried to help those persons displaced by urban renewal (if in a somewhat paternalistic
way), see A. A. MERMIN, RELOCATING FAMILIES: THE NEW HAVEN EXPERIENCE, 1956 TO 1966

(1970).
38. Martin Anderson first raised this point and was forced to conclude that the answer is
that there just are not many standard homes available at low rents in convenient areas.
ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 52-56. Today, the housing market is considerably tighter than when
Anderson was writing in 1960-61, and the number of standard homes available at low rents in
convenient areas is correspondingly lower.
39. See, e.g., Community Redev. Agency of Los Angeles v. Abrams, 15 Cal. 3d 813, 543
P.2d 905, 126 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1975). It should be noted that under California's recently enacted
Eminent Domain Law, loss of business goodwill will be compensable under certain circumstances. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§1263.510-1263.530. The Abrams decision is, however, fairly
typical of orthodox judicial reactions to claims of small businessmen for compensation for their
business losses when they are unable to relocate a business which had the misfortune to be
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caused by relocation, 40 to say nothing of the psychological costs of forced
dislocation and the disruption of one's life, educational damage inflicted by
41
midstream changes in schools, and other intangibles.
The redevelopment agencies contend that society's benefits in ridding
itself of slums and blighted areas are so great that we should spend billions
of dollars 42 of the taxpayers' money to forcibly displace millions of citizens
from their homes. Even if the urban renewal program actually accomplished
its stated goals of eliminating slums and blight, the question remains
whether the financial and human cost is not too high a price to pay for the
supposed benefits. The fact is that urban renewal has not only failed to meet
its goals, 43 it no longer is even primarily concerned with removing slums.
Urban renewal today-particularly in California-is a synonym for sub44
sidizing the development of favored shopping centers and industrial parks.
The human toll thus becomes unconscionable.
This article seeks to explore how the American public came to be saddled
with agencies that "can condemn as blighted any piece of property they
choose, and then turn it over to any private interest they wish, at any price
they designate";45 which are "essentially beyond the control of the legislative body that created [them], and [are] subject to no referendum by the
voters, either on a city or state level"; 46 and which, furthermore, help
themselves to a hefty share of local tax revenues without the need to obtain
the approval of, or even consult, the local taxing and legislative bodies.
Before turning to the pertinent law-such as it is-it may help to state the
problem in terms of a concrete example.
B.

The Saga of Mr. Morris
Let us suppose that in the City of Yonkers, Mr. Morris owns property
adjacent to land owned by Otis Elevator Company, which wants to expand
its facilities. Otis, therefore, offers to buy the Morris property, but Mr.
Morris does not want to sell. The offer may be too low, or perhaps Mr.
Morris winces at the thought of pulling up stakes and relocating. Possibly,
he may be loath to dislocate his business after building up a clientele in his
standing in the path of the bulldozer. Two recent decisions going the other way are City of
Lansing v. Wery, 68 Mich. App. 158, 242 N.W.2d 51 (1976) (unique operation in a unique
location whose success was not dependant on the enterprise of the particular owners); and State
v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 826 (Alaska 1976) (older view exemplified by Abrams rejected

outright by the Alaska Supreme Court).
40.

E.g., Los Gatos v. Sund, 234 Cal. App. 2d 24, 44 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1965). Relocation

statutes, originally heralded as a solution to this problem, are increasingly proving illusory in
spite of frequent amendments. See text accompanying notes 299-335 infra.
41. See note 8 supra.
42. For figures from Los Angeles County alone, see note 27 supra.
43. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 6; HARTMAN, supra note 1; S. GREER, URBAN
RENEWAL AND AMERICAN CITIES (1965).
44. See generally WALLIN & DILKES, supra note 23.
45. CITIZEN'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRIcT REDEVELOPMENT PLAN, MINORrTY REPORT, in L.A. Daily J., July 21, 1976, at I, col. 4.
46. Id. CompareGibbs v. City of Napa, 59 Cal. App. 3d 148, 130 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1972).
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present location. 47 Whatever the reason, Mr. Morris turns a deaf ear to Otis'
entreaties.
Otis is unhappy. This makes the city fathers unhappy. They leave no
stone unturned in their effort to cater to Otis-a large taxpayer and source of
employment in Yonkers-even going so far as to offer Otis two or three
different sites for expansion, all of which are rejected as uneconomical or
unsuitable, even though none of the parcels is "substandard" land. Otis
then threatens to leave Yonkers if suitable land is not found for the desired
modernization and expansion of its plant. Almost as an afterthought, Otis
lets it be known that the Morris parcel would be "suitable" for its needs.
Breathing a collective sigh of relief, the city fathers quickly sign a contract
with Otis that it will remain in Yonkers if they procure the coveted land and
resell it to Otis-at a discount, of course.
The next step is to have the Yonkers Community Development Agency
make a finding that the Morris property is "substandard." The agency does
so, but fails to indicate any grounds for the finding. To Mr. Morris' howls of
outrage, the agency merely replies that its findings are conclusive and
establish a public purpose as a matter of law.
Sometime later, the city council finally holds public hearings on the
condemnation of the Morris property. The redevelopment agency then files
an eminent domain proceeding to acquire the property, which Mr. Morris
opposes, alleging that his land is not substandard and that it is not being
taken for a public purpose.4 8 In the trial court, the judge inexplicably rules
that no hearing is required and grants summary judgment of condemnation
to the redevelopment agency. An intermediate court affirms the result, one
judge dissenting.
The rationale behind this strange ruling is that the legislative findings
establish that the property in question is appropriate for urban renewal. 4 9
The appellate court briefly notes that the findings also reflect the recognized
desire of Otis for expansion.
47. Perhaps 20 percent of the businesses displaced by urban renewal fail to relocate
successfully and go out of existence. Urban Renewal Administration statistics (unpublished)

and studies made in Boston and Baltimore, in Millspaugh, Problems and Opportunities of
Relocation, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 25 (1961). For individually owned small businesses that

rent their premises, the number unable to relocate rises to over 50 percent. See HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY OF COMPENSATION AND AssIsTance
FOR PERSONS AFFECTED BY REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION IN FEDERAL AND FEDERALLY

ASSIsTED PROGRAMS (Comm. Print No. 31, Dec. 22, 1964). See also ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, RELOCATION: UNEQUAL
BUSINESSES DISPLACED BY GOVERNMENT (Jan. 1965).

TREATMENT

OF

PEOPLE

AND

48. Private property may not be taken by the government except for public use and upon
payment of just compensation. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The mandate of the fifth amendment is
binding on the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Chicago,
B.&Q.R.R. v. Chicago 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Additionally, all states but one, North Carolina,
have a similar guarantee in their state constitutions; North Carolina follows the same rule by
decisional law.
49. This in spite of the fact that the redevelopment agency merely concluded that the
property was substandard without citing reasons!
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Mr. Morris shakes his head in bewilderment. After all, this is America;
he has some constitutional rights (or so he has been told). Because Mr.
Morris is law-abiding and believes in the essential fairness of our courts, he
tries again. This time, his case is to be heard by the Court of Appeals of New
York, the supreme judicial tribunal of that state. Now he will get justice.
Alas for Mr. Morris, his expectations must be lowered. Out of a total of
12 justices in two appellate courts, only one justice on the lower appellate
court was willing to grant Mr. Morris so much as a hearing before stripping
him of his property.5"
These are the facts of an actual case. 51 The dissenting justice stated that
the redevelopment agency set out to acquire the land, clear it, grade it, and
then sell it to Otis, and "all this under the guise of urban renewal.' 52 The
remaining justices disagreed.
The Court of Appeals first found that it did not undercut the public
purpose of the condemnation that Otis was looking to acquire the Morris
parcel to serve its own pecuniary interests. Furthermore, "the fact that the
council's public hearings were held after the selection of Otis as sponsor
rather than beforehand, or that the city openly and admittedly signed an
agreement with Otis before the condemnation of the land. . . in the light of
Otis' ongoing economic importance to the community, must, at most, be
regarded as mere 53 irregularities cured by the fact that the hearings were
actually held." 54
The court likewise found nothing wrong in Yonkers' desire to keep Otis
ensconced in its present location; nor was it deemed remarkable that Otis
should get the condemned land for only a fraction of its fair market value,
paid to Mr. Morris and the other former owners. 55 The court observed that it
has the power to review an agency finding of blight only upon a limited
basis; nevertheless it conceded that more data as to the area's condition must
be submitted than the agency supplied here. Yet, even though the court
expressly disagreed with the contention that an agency finding of blight was
conclusive, it held that Mr. Morris must lose since his pleadings supposedly
failed to raise the issue of the blighted quality of the land taken in a proper
50. It bears noting that the United States Supreme Court, in a somewhat different
context, has held that minimum due process requires that debtors not be deprived of their

property by creditors without prior notice andahearing. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
51. Yonkers Community Dev. Agency v. Morris, 45 App. Div. 2d 889, 357 N.Y.S.2d 887
(1974), aff'd, 37 N.Y.2d 478, 335 N.E.2d 327, 373 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1975), appeal dismissed for
want of a substantialfederal question, 423 U.S. 1010 (1975).
52. 45 App. Div. 2d at 890, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 889-90.

53. For another instance of that court's creative use of the disparaging adjective "mere",
see Kanner, CondemnationBlight: Just How Just is Just Compensation?48 NOTRE DAME LAW.
765, 797 n.169 (1973).
54. 37 N.Y.2d at 482, 335 N.E.2d at 331, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 118 (emphasis added). Cf. L.
CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND, ch. 12: "Sentence first-verdict afterwards."
55. 37 N.Y.2d at 483, 335 N.E.2d at 331, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
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fashion. Anyway, said the court, the taking had already occurred without
hindrance, and the buildings had been demolished. For good measure, the
Court of Appeals berated Mr. Morris for his supposed desire to wreak
"vengeance" on the city. It is a final irony that shortly after this municipal
handout received the judicial imprimatur in the Morris case, Yonkers went
into default and was unable to meet a $2.5 million payroll,5 6 thus justifying
the suspicion, if not conclusion, that Otis' prosperity was subsidized by
bankrupting the taxpayers.
The moral of this sad saga is that a large, influential corporation with
local clout may be able to use the local government to procure land for it at a
price substantially below market value. The city's use of eminent domain is
supposedly required to eliminate small, niggling landowners who might
stand in the way of "progress" and either refuse to sell their land, or avail
themselves of market dynamics that might enable them (as holdouts after
surrounding parcels had already been obtained) to extract higher prices from
the likes of Otis.
Although morally indefensible and shocking to the average citizen, the
Morris decisions are completely compatible with the mainstream of judicial
thought in urban renewal cases. Almost without exception, 57 property owners have fared very poorly when pitted against a redevelopment agency.
And, as is often the case generally (and particularly in the context of
redevelopment), the burden falls hardest on those least able to bear it. Let us
therefore leave poor Mr. Morris and move on to a closer examination of
certain aspects of the redevelopment process.
C. Slums, Blight, and Relocation
The assumption is widespread that persons displaced by the urban renewal bulldozer are well taken care of by the government. Although urban
renewal is only one of several programs which forcibly uproot people,
within the constraints of this article we can touch only incidentally upon
relocations caused by others such as highway construction, property acquisitions for local, state, and federal public improvements, and local housing
code enforcement programs.
Under the National Housing Act of 1949,58 the federal government set out
to eliminate substandard housing by "clearance of slums and blighted
areas," admittedly nebulous terms. "Slum" has been variously defined as a
"heavily populated area in which housing and other living conditions are
extremely poor";59 a "section of a city wherein poor and underprivileged
56. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 1976, at 65.

57. See Adams v. Hous. Auth. of Daytona Beach, 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952); Grubstein v.
Urban Renewal Agency, 115 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1959).
58. 42 U.S.C. §1441 (1970).

59. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, Unabridged 1712 (2d ed. 1964).
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persons are housed in inferior and dilapidated dwellings, flats, apartment
houses, and tenements";60 and a "squalid, dirty street or quarter of a city,
town or village, ordinarily inhabited by the very poor, destitute or criminal
classes [and of which] overcrowding is usually a prevailing characteristic. " 61 However defined, a "slum" is something on whose attributes rational persons can agree, if only in some "I know it when I see it" manner.
But a blighted area is not the same as a slum, and therein lies a tale. Blight
generally refers to an uneconomic land use. For example, a vacant lot may
be condemned simply because it may one day become a slum, 62 even though
it is not presently slum property. In Morris, the redevelopment agency may
have considered the property blighted because, compared to Otis' proposed
use of the land, under Mr. Morris it was "stagnating.' '63
A "blighted area" is defined by one respectable dictionary as an "unaesthetic and uneconomic section; an area of such kind that razing all the
buildings will serve a public purpose, even though a few of them may not be
substandard or blighted.''6 4 The circularity of expression renders such a
definition less than helpful, but the gist of the idea is that if the local
redevelopment authority should decide that the land on which your $50,000
single-family home is located could be put to a "higher and better use" as
$100,000 condominiums, a retail shopping center, or an expansion site for
the local elevator tycoon, it could make a "finding" that the land is
"blighted" and start the redevelopment process. In actuality, however,
upper and middle-class neighborhoods are unlikely to be condemned under
the urban renewal program because their residents are generally well edu60. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1187 (3d ed. 1969).
61. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1560 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).

62. Cannata v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 210, 182 N.E.2d 395 (1962). Cities may also
condemn unblighted property to prevent future damaging blight. Free State Realty Co., Inc. v.
City of Baltimore, 32 Md. App. 11, 359 A.2d 94 (1976).

The determination of blight is left in the hands of the government agency responsible for the
project:
The determination of what constitutes a redevelopment area and what property is to
be taken is primarily a matter for the redevelopment agency, and its decision is open
to judicial review only to discover whether it has acted unreasonably or in bad faith
or has exceeded its powers.
Graham v. Houlihan, 147 Conn. 321, 323, 160 A.2d 745, 749 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833

(1960).
63. The court said:
[A]reas eligible for [urban] renewal are not limited to "slums" as that term was
formerly applied,. . . among other things, economic underdevelopment and stagnation are also threats to the public sufficient to make their removal cognizable as a
public purpose.

Yonkers Community Dev. Agency v. Morris, 37 N.Y.2d 478, 481, 335 N.E.2d 327, 330, 373
N.Y.S. 2d 112, 117 (1975). Compare Sweetwater Valley Civic Ass'n. v. City of National City,

18 Cal. 3d 270, 555 P.2d 1099, 133 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1976), where the California Supreme Court
held that the decision as to whether the subject property is blighted so as to justify a redevelopment project must be made on the basis of the property's present condition, rather than on the

basis of the fact that the redevelopment agency might put it to a better use. The California court
decided that the redevelopment agency's finding of blight did not justify the conversion of a
golf course into a shopping center by means of the redevelopment process.
64. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 141 (3d ed. 1969).
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cated and will organize to protest the intrusion of the bulldozers. 65
The various definitions of slums and blighted areas obviously vary somewhat in content, but all are alike in applying value judgments to housing
typically inhabited by the poorer elements of society. Also typically, the
value judgments are made by middle or upper-middle class planners. Unfortunately, the poor person and the middle or upper-middle class planner
simply do not view a neighborhood through the same set of'societal values.
The planner's slum may well be the poor person's comfortable, stable,
66
low-rent area.
The middle-class and the workirig-class have different spatial concepts of
their dwelling areas. The middle-class live within the area bounded by the
outside walls of their house. Although they may spend some time in their
back yards and front yards, these are viewed as adjuncts to the dwelling.
This concept of the dwelling area is totally at odds with the working-class
utilization of living space. To the working-class, the local area beyond the
dwelling unit is an integral part of the home, 67 and much of the socializing
activity is conducted in this local area. The forced removal from one's home
is bound to be a highly disruptive and disturbing experience, regardless of
the victim's socio-economic background. But forced removal from the
social and spatial unity of the working-class community involves a wrench
of a higher order of magnitude than removal from the typical middle-class
community. The majority of those displaced from a working-class neighborhood react with a grief response showing most of the characteristics of grief
and mourning for a lost person. 68 The main components of the grief reaction
65. See, e.g., Gunzburg, TransportationProblems of the Megalopolitan, 12 U.C.L.A. L.

REV. 800 (1965).
66. See text accompanying notes 73-87 infra.
67. This attachement to the local area has been explained as follows:

In studying the reasons for satisfaction that the majority of slum residents experience, two major components have emerged. On the one hand, the residential area is

the region in which a vast and interlocking set of social networks is localized. And, on
the other, the physical area had considerable meaning as an extension of home, in
which various parts, are delineated and structured on the basis of a sense of belong-

ing. These two components provide the context in which the residential area may so
easily be invested with considerable, multiply-determined meaning. . . . [T]he greatest proportion of this working-class group. . . shows a fairly common experience
and usage of the residential area . . . dominated by a conception of the local area
beyond the dwelling unit as an integral part of home. This view of an area as home
and the significance of local people and local places are so profoundly at variance

with typical middle-class orientationsthat it is difficult to appreciatethe intensity of
meaning, the basicsense of identity involved in living in the particulararea. (emphasis

added)
Fried & Gleicher, Some Sources of ResidentialSatisfaction in an UrbanSlum, 27 J. Am. INST.
PLANNERS 305 (1961) in URBAN RENEWAL: PEOPLE, POLITICS AND PLANNING, 120, 134-35 (J.
Bellush and M. Hausknecht, ed. 1967). Aside from reliance on such studies, it is a commonly

observable phenomenon that in working-class neighborhoods, such activities as socializing on
the front steps or over the back fence are a commonly accepted part of social life.
68. Fried in WILSON. supra note 10, at 377.

For some time we have known that the forced dislocation from an urban slum is a
highly disruptive and disturbing experience. . . . There are wide variations in the
success of post-relocation adjustment and considerable variability in the depth and

quality of the loss experience. But for the majority it seems quite precise to speak of
their reactions as expressions of grief. These are manifest in the feelings of painful
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are the fragmentation of the sense of spatial identity and the fragmentation
of the sense of group identity based largely on the external availability and
overt contact with familiar groups of people. 69 In one study, this grief
response was manifested as much as two years after the relocation occurred.
The frequency of the response did not appear to be affected by factors such
as increase or decrease in the size of the new home or ownership rather than
rental.70
In general, administrators of urban redevelopment projects assert that
they are actually bettering people's lives by moving them out of housing
which the administrators consider "substandard." Relocation is described
as "an opportunity, rather than a hardship. '"71 Renewal administrators
profess to be solicitous of older families who live in houses supposedly too
big for their needs or whose maintenance costs may exceed their owners'
pocketbook-all seen through the agency's eyes, of course. Urban renewal
is praised as providing a chance for this mythical owner saddled with an
oversized home to sell the house and relocate into a more suitable dwelling.7 2 Unfortunately, the owner is seldom asked beforehand what he wants
to do.
Under the 1949 Housing Act, redevelopment agencies are charged with
providing decent, safe, and sanitary housing in convenient locations and at
prices the displaced persons can afford. The goal is to eliminate slums and
blighted areas. To better understand the redevelopment process, it is necessary to examine some actual projects. Three projects will be considered
here: in one, the city wished to replace low-rent housing with luxury
apartments; in the second, the redevelopment agency was determined to
erect a tourist center and office buildings on the site of a low-cost neighborhood that catered mainly to older, single men; and in the third, the business
interests of a downtown shopping center wanted to extend and renovate their
shopping area in order to be more competitive with other, more recently
constructed shopping centers. In spite of the differing goals in each project,
there are similarities in the way the projects were advertised to the general
populace, in the way the residents of the project sites were treated, and in
the growing, if often ineffective, resort to the courts in order to halt, at least
temporarily, the redevelopment process.
loss, the continued longing, the general depressive tone, frequent symptoms of
psychological or social or somatic distress, the active work required in adapting to the
altered situation, the sense of helplessness, the occasional expressions of both direct
and displaced anger, and tendencies to idealize the lost place. Id. at 359-60.
69. Id. at 377.
70. Id. at 378.
71. LINDBLOOM & FARRAH, supra note 3, at 109.
72. Id.
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CASE STUDIES

A.

73
Boston's West End

The West End was a white, European working-class neighborhood which
was torn down by the urban renewal program between 1958 and 1960. The
residents had a well-developed social life with long-standing relationships
among themselves and a high degree of attachment to the neighborhood.
The decision to redevelop the area was made in the early 1950's and
received the blessings of the city's decisive business leaders and politicians
even though prior to 1951, the West End had few slum buildings. The 1950
United States Census showed that only about 20 percent of the dwellings
were dilapidated or lacked a private bath,7 4 and the area containing most of
these buildings-the worst in the West End-was not included in the
redevelopment area. After the announcement of the inclusion of the area in a
redevelopment project in 1951, landlords ceased repairing their buildings
and the area quickly deteriorated. Apartments and whole buildings were
vacated, thus adding to the spiral of increasing deterioration. This pattern
frequently occurs in redevelopment areas; it is known as "condemnation
75
blight."
The city's main argument for terming the area a "slum," and thus
suitable for renewal, rested on an appraisal made in 1953 which judged 63.5
percent of the dwelling units substandard.7 6 Aside from the obvious defects
that the appraisal reflected middle-class values, and the items appraised did
not sufficiently distinguish between harmful conditions (e.g., rats in the
building) and lack of amenities (e.g., rooms lacking closets),7 7 it must be
pointed out that the appraisal was made after the city had already decided to
redevelop the area. Considering the pervasive phenomenon of precondemnation (or planning) blight, the validity of this appraisal as a basis
78
for redevelopment is thus open to question.
73. The Center for Community Studies conducted an extensive research program among
relocated West Enders as part of a program of studies concerning hazards to health and
emotional well-being caused by forced relocation of families with varying ethnic and cultural

backgrounds. Out of this program came several articles; Fried in WILSON supra note 10, at 359;

Fried & Gleicher, Some Sources of ResidentialSatisfaction in an UrbanSlum, 27 J. AM. INST.
PLANNERS 305 (1961), in URBAN RENEWAL: PEOPLE, POLITICS AND PLANNING 120 (J. Bellush &
M. Hausknecht, ed. 1967); Hartman in WILSON, supra note 10, at 293. Additionally, Herbert J.
Gans, Ph.D., a sociologist who lived in the West End as a participant-observer for some six or
seven months immediately prior to the onset of redevelopment, reported on his experiences as
part of the research program in H. GANS, THE URBAN VILLAGERS (1962) [hereinafter cited as
GANS]. Most of the information on the West End project is taken from Dr. Gans' work.
74. Hartman, Housing in the West End, Boston, Center for Community Studies Research
Memorandum C 1, Oct. 1961, in GANS. supra note 73, at 315.
75. See Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just is Just Compensation?48 NOTRE
DAME LAW, 765, 767-69 (1973) and cases collected there, for a description of the mechanics of

such deterioration.
76. GANS, supra note 73, at 313.

77. Id.
78. Id. at 314. Gans estimated in 1958, after the blighting process had proceeded for
several years, that only 25 to 35 percent of the buildings in the project area were structurally
unsound.
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The city's desire to tear down the West End stemmed primarily from a
desire to enrich the city treasury. 7 9 The West End was centrally located,
adjacent to an area of luxury housing and near the downtown shopping area.
A long block fronting on the Charles River was considered attractive for
additional luxury housing.8 0 Attracting "quality shoppers" to this area
would supposedly end the decline of the downtown shopping district.
Additionally, the nearby Massachusetts General Hospital wanted to expand,
8
and its trustees preferred not to be surrounded by low-income neighbors. 1
One would be justified in concluding that terming the area a "slum" was a
ploy designed to convince the general public that the area should be torn
down. A more accurate description of the West End would have been a
82
stable, low-rent area.
Boston's use of the redevelopment process to rid itself of low-income
areas yielding fewer dollars for the tax coffers and to substitute luxury
apartments in their stead was incomprehensible to the West Enders.8 3 Not
only did they fail to understand the nature of the redevelopment process,
they were additionally hampered by an inability to believe that the government would encourage a venture designed to substitute luxury housing for
their own homes.8 4 They, therefore, failed to organize any effective protest
against the taking of their homes. In the nearby North End, on the other
hand, even though the area was more blighted than the West End, the
cohesiveness of the Italian community helped to save the area from
85
renewal.
Until the city actually took the area within the redevelopment project
under eminent domain proceedings, and the West Enders began taking their
rent payments to a city office, they were totally unable to comprehend the
imminent destruction of their neighborhood.8 6 By this time, it was too late to
protest.
79. Id. at 285.
80. Id. at 286, 317.

81. Id.at 286, 317-18.
82. Id.at 316.
83. An interesting side note is that the redevelopment contract in the West End project
was awarded to the second highest bidder, a lawyer-friend of the mayor, after the highest
bidder withdrew. Id. at 291.
84. One of the authors of this article, in over a decade of intensive eminent domain
practice, has seen this phenomenon time and again: in spite of glib popular disparagement of
-government bureaucrats" or "politicians", most citizens have an abiding belief that when the
chips are down, they will receive fair treatment from theirgovernment. The realization that one
has been misled by one's government is one that is slow to sink in, and this delayed process
usually results in a lack of organized or effective opposition to the project until it is too late.
85. GANs, supra note 73, at 298.
86. Id. at 292.
The steps in the redevelopment process were interpreted as attempts to scare the
West Enders out of the area, so the values of the buildings would be reduced and the
private developers could buy them more cheaply. But even then, people were
skeptical that this scheme would come to fruition, partially because it was so immoral. Many West Enders argued that only in Russia could the government deprive
citizens of their property in such a dictatorial manner.
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People started moving out, a process that began before the actual taking
but accelerated afterward. The end of the neighborhood as a viable dwelling
place came quickly:
As buildings began to empty, the remaining tenants were loath to
remain in them, and even those who had planned to stay to the
bitter end began to leave. People were afraid of being alone, of
being the last in the house and thus isolated from the group. Then,
unknown teenagers began to roam through semi-deserted buildings, using them for nocturnal parties, setting fires, and vandalizing wherever they could. The families still remaining in these
buildings became fearful and moved more quickly than they had
intended. The empty structures were torn down as soon as the last
tenant left, and the resulting noise and dirt encouraged people in
adjacent buildings to move also. Consequently, the West End was
emptied in little more than eighteen months after the official
taking the land. 87
Prior to renewal, the area had been home to some 7,500 persons.
1.

Comments: SociologicalAspects

In ascertaining the costs of urban renewal, it is necessary to examine both
the emotional and the economic costs inflicted upon the displaced population. In the West End, relocation caused a severe emotional shock to the
residents. In interviews two years after relocation had occurred, 54 percent
of the women and 46 percent of the men expressed severely depressed or
disturbed reactions to the tearing down of the neighborhood. For women
who had lived in the area for a long time, 64 percent of those interviewed
exhibited such reactions; and, among the women who had liked living in the
West End very much, 73 percent expressed a severe post-relocation grief
88
reaction.
The evidence demonstrates that in terms of emotional suffering, for the
large majority of West Enders, relocation failed to live up to its billing as
"an opportunity, rather than a hardship." Therefore, if relocation is to be
successful, it must provide sufficient benefits to the displaced population to
outweigh the emotional costs. But in the West End, relocation failed to
provide such a balance or to provide relief in terms of better housing or
housing at lower cost. Although the physical quality of the housing into
which the West Enders relocated was generally an improvement over their
former homes, there is reason to believe that this apparent amelioration in
housing quality may have been a reflection of the pre-condemnation blighting of the West End.8 9
87. Id. at 303-04 (footnote omitted); see Kanner, CondemnationBlight: Just How Just is
Just Compensation?48 NoTRE DAME LAw, 765 (1973).
88. Fried in WILSON, supra note 10, at 360-65.
89. Hartman in WILSON, supra note 10, at 303.
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As a result of relocation, there was a slight lowering of apartment
densities; however, overcrowding had not been a problem in the West
End. 90 Of more concern to the West Enders was the marked increase in
housing costs. The median rent 91 rose 73 percent; 86 percent of the
displaced persons paid higher rents after relocation; and a higher proportion
of the income was generally spent for housing. 92 Furthermore, a relatively
large number of families either lived in substandard housing after relocation
or failed to improve their overall residential status. 93 Apparently, the only
"benefit" the large majority of West Enders received was the opportunity to
allocate a larger share of their incomes to landlords and mortgage holders.
The phenomenon of increased housing costs following relocation is
characteristic not only of the West End, but of urban renewal projects in
general. As low-rent housing is removed from the market, there is a sudden
and often large-scale increase in demand for housing which, even if not of
the same quality, may be had for the same cost. Nearby landlords are quick
to respond to increased market demands and raise their rents accordingly.
Owners of low-rent units on the project's peripheries are thus one of the few
real beneficiaries of urban renewal. If such low-cost rental units are included
in a project, their owners are generally the only persons compensated in
eminent domain proceedings. And if the buildings are left standing, the
owners are able to charge higher rents without improving the quality of the
dwelling units. As a further note on the West End experience, only 15
percent of the families reported receiving help from relocation officials in
94
finding new dwellings.
As happened in the West End, many areas slated for redevelopment
projects contain a considerable number of standard housing units. Redevelopment on an area-wide basis is permitted on the theory that if individual
owners were permitted to argue that their particular property, not being
"substandard," should not be taken, integrated plans for redevelopment
would suffer. 95 However, for those persons living in standard dwellings
before relocation, housing gains will be minimal at best and are more likely
to be negative.
90. Id. at 300-02.
91. "Rent" is used to indicate "housing costs" for both owners and renters.
92. Hartman in WILSON, supra note 10, at 306-11.

In the West End, 88 percent of all households were paying less than $55 per month for
their apartments, while only 30 percent were paying similarly low rents after relocation. Conversely, only 2 percent were paying $75 per month or more in the West End,
while after relocation 45 percent were paying at least $75 per month, and 20 percent
were paying over $95 per month.

Id. at 306. Hartman surveyed a random sample of 500 displaced West End households-some
20 percent of the 7,500 persons who had been living in the West End just before it was
demolished.
93. Id. at 309.

94. Id. at 314.
95. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34-35 (1954).
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It is readily apparent that large projects whose primary reason for renewal
relates to the proposed re-use of the site (e.g., downtown central business
district redevelopments, luxury apartments, etc.) contain a good deal of
standard housing and commercial structures. However, because the same
agency is responsible for finding blight, executing the project, and reporting
on the after-affects of relocation, there is an increased tendency for redevelopment agencies to find "blight" in any area they consider economically
rewarding to redevelop. It bears noting that when the United States Comptroller General began spot-checking local renewal operations in 1962, he
found that only 20 percent of the buildings in Cleveland's Erieview renewal
project were substandard, although the local redevelopment agency had
classified 71 percent of the buildings as substandard. 96 Such findings are
hardly unexpected, because the redevelopment agencies-as noted
elsewhere in this article-possess the power to find "blight" by their
unrestrained ipse dixit.
An additional defect of the relocation scheme is its tendency to provide
the least benefits to those who need the most help, namely the poorest
residents of the project area. Poor persons are usually unaware of the
possibility of relocation assistance, so they fail to contact officials. The
officials fail to go out into the community and seek out such persons. The
result is that many people simply get lost in the redevelopment process.
Even when the poor seek assistance, they may find that they are actually too
poor to qualify for public housing, assuming any is available. 97 As a result,
98
urban renewal benefits the rich while worsening the lot of the poor.
The West End project occurred some 18 years ago and, arguably, represents an older, less enlightened form of urban renewal. It may therefore be
helpful to look at a more recent example of the redevelopment process.
B.

Yerba Buena Center

Yerba Buena Center [hereinafter referred to as YBCI-a proposed 87acre, half-billion dollar complex of convention and sports facilities, office
buildings and parking garages-had its genesis in a "San Francisco Prosper96. URBAN RENEWAL ADMINISTRATION, HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: PREMATURE APPROVAL OF LARGE-SCALE DEMOLITION
FOR ERIEVIEW URBAN RENEWAL PROJECT 1, CLEVELAND. OHIO (June 1963), in Hartman in
WILSON, supra note 10, at 329.
97. The myriad problems of public housing-and trying to find locations for these developments-could easily consume an entire article. Suffice it to note that the United States
Supreme Court has upheld mandatory referendums on public housing projects, James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), and it is a pervasive phenomenon that most communities pay lip
service to the need for providing public housing to low-income families, while strenuously
objecting to having a low-cost housing project in their own backyard. Cf. Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975); cert. denied 423
U.S. 808 (1975).

98. It is perhaps revealing that only one-half of one percent of the $2.2 billion of gross
project costs for all federally-aided urban renewal projects (through 1960) was spent on
relocation. M. Anderson, The Federal Urban Renewal Program:A Financialand Economic
Analysis (1962) (unpublished dissertation, M.I.T.) in Hartman in WILSON, supra note 10, at
321-22.
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ity Plan" for the area south of Market Street in 1954. 99 But the city planning
director found insufficient blighting in the proposed redevelopment area, so
the plan was dropped. In 1959, however, a committee of corporate leaders

formed the San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association
[hereinafter referred to as SPUR] and began planning for South of Market
slum clearance.
Federal urban renewal requires citizen participation in the planning process. 10 0 The group chosen to fulfill this function for the YBC was SPUR, 10 1
in reality a committee composed solely of the city's corporate and financial
interests. As the official citizen committee, however, SPUR assumed responsibility for the welfare of the residents of South of Market. 102
The residents of South of Market consisted of some 4,000 persons,
including about 300 families, who lived in the area's cheap residential hotels
and ate in its many inexpensive restaurants. Most were elderly disabled or
retired men who had to survive on the meager proceeds of fixed pensions
99. HARTMAN, supra note I at 23-27, contains a concise summary of the chronology of the
Yerba Buena Center and is heavily relied on here in lieu of the authors' own restatement of the
issues underlying the lawsuit by Tenants and Owners in Opposition to Redevelopment (TOOR).
Two more lawsuits were filed in state court, both challenging the basic financing plan approved
for YBC as an illegal circumvention of the constitutional requirement that the voters must
approve general obligation bonds by a two-thirds majority. Essentially, the suits charge that
because San Francisco, through its leasing agreement with the Redevelopment Agency, must
back up with city funds any deficiency in theamount of projected revenue needed to pay off the
lease revenue bonds the Agency would issue for construction of the Central Blocks public
facilities, the arrangement is, in effect, a general obligation bond issue. In addition, one of the
suits sought to halt the project for failure to comply with the provisions of the California
Environmental Quality Act. As of March, 1974, both suits were still pending, thereby halting
the project because bonds cannot be sold with litigation pending over the legality of the bond
issue; however, San Francisco mayor, George Moscone, recently stated that the long-stalled
YBC convention center "is on the threshold of being built" if voters approve a 2 percent
increase in the city's hotel tax in November 1976. "We're attempting to develop south of
Market St. . . . When that happens, the winos and alkies, they move away and they go up a
little bit farther north. . .". according to the mayor. L.A. Times, Sept. 19, 1976, §1, at 18, col.
2.
100. Citizen participation is one of the required seven elements of the Workable Program
for Community Improvement which a community must undertake in order to qualify for federal
urban renewal grants. Two citizen committees must be established: one is a city-wide committee of citizens who represent a cross-section of the community, and the other is a subcommittee
responsible for helping to solve minority group housing problems.
101. In 1972, SPUR was composed of several directors from the Bay Area Council, and top
executives of the Bank of America, the Bechtel Corp., Crocker Bank, Crown Zellerbach, Del
Monte, Blyth & Co., Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., Pacific Telephone and Telegraph, Joseph
Magnin Co., Levi Strauss, Pacific Gas & Electric Co., Roth Properties, Standard Oil of
California, Stauffer Chemical Co., Southern Pacific, and the Wells Fargo Bank. HARTMAN,
supra note 1, at 37.
102. As San Francisco's official Citizens Action Committee, SPUR issued a publication
entitled Prologue for Action in 1966 from which the following statements are taken:
If San Francisco decides to compete effectively with other cities for new 'clean'
industries and new corporate power, its population will move closer to standard
White Anglo-Saxon Protestant characteristics. As automation increases, the need of
unskilled labor will decrease. Economically and socially, the population will tend to
range from lower middle-class through lower upper class . . ..
Selection of a population's composition might be undemocratic. Influence on it,
however, is legal and desirable for the health of the city. A workable though changing
balance of economic levels, social types, age levels, and other factors must be
maintained. Influence on these factors should be exerted in many ways-for example, changing the quality of housing, schools, and job opportunities.
SPUR, Prologuefor Action, quoted in HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 106.
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and Social Security benefits. 10 3 The San Francisco Redevelopment Agency
[hereinafter referred to as SFRA] portrayed these people as "bums," "drifters," and "transients" in an attempt to present the YBC as a public service
which would rid the city of an "undesirable element" in addition to
revival through more construction jobs and convention
providing economic
4

business. 10

The South of Market area, a shabby but sunny and flat area in an
otherwise hilly and foggy city, is located near San Francisco's transportation
hub. Although it provided its residents with a community of other single
men with common backgrounds and experiences, 10 5 in the words of the
SFRA executive°6director: "This land is too valuable to permit poor people
10
to park on it."
The corporate community planned to make South of Market part of San
Francisco's central office district and visualized YBC as the beginning of
this plan. SFRA, in accord with the business interests, was totally committed to creation of a "protected environment" 10 7 and removal of all the poor
people from the YBC area, excepting one lone senior citizens' housing
project stuck off to one side of the redevelopment area where it would be far
removed from the convention center complex.
For a time, all proceeded according to schedule. The United States
Housing and Home Finance Agency approved a $600,000 planning grant for
YBC (October 1962) and set aside a $19.6 million grant for the project (June
1965). The necessary approval was obtained from the Planning Commission
(January 1966) and the Board of Supervisors (April 1966), and SFRA began
to displace the residents and demolish the buildings (July 1967). A former
Redevelopment Agency Chairman (Joseph Alioto) was even elected mayor
through a campaign financed by the pro-YBC interests (September 1967).108
103. Surveys undertaken for the Redevelopment Agency indicate that 75 percent of the
individual householders were over 45 years old, 94 percent were men, and 57 percent had
incomes of less than $200 per month. Nearly 90 percent of all individual householders were
white, although most families in the project area were non-white. See E.M. SCHAFFRAN & CO.,
RELOCATION SURVEY REPORT, SOUTH OF MARKET REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT(Dec., 1963 & July,

1965) in HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 96.
104. HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 97-98. Typical of the city's attitude toward the residents of

South of Market is the following Editorial, San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 15, 1970, and June 11,
1971:

Nor do we believe that such people should have the right-in the absence of some
compelling reason deeply rooted in the public good-to delay and quite possibly kill a

major public project of profound importance to the economic well-being of a city that
is not really their home community, that they have built no stake in, that they make

no attempt to adorn, and to which they are on the whole an unsought burden.
HARTMAN. supra note 1, at 93.
105. HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 96-97.

106. Justin Herman, executive director, SFRA, 1970, in HARTMAN. supra note 1, at 114.
107. The idea was to prevent former residents from moving back into or adjacent to the

project area. This was accomplished by surrounding the central development of the renewal
project with peripheral construction (e.g., office buildings) which served as a physical barrier.
HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 89-91.

108. Id. at 56-64.
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In late 1968, the schedule collapsed. The residents of South of Market did
not leave quietly as had the West Enders. Instead, they began complaining
of the poor quality relocation offerings and of maltreatment by SFRA
relocation workers. They were able to convince the San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation [hereinafter referred to as SFNLAF]
to petition the Department of Housing and Urban Development [hereinafter
referred to as HUD] 10 9 for administrative hearings on the YBC relocation
plan. HUD's denial of this first petition was based on the ground that little
actual displacement had yet occurred, although displacement had been in
progress since 1967 and had accelerated in 1968-1969.11 A second petition
by SFNLAF in the spring of 1969 fared no better. HUD again denied the
petition, this time contending that because it lacked a mechanism for hearing
relocation complaints, it was impossible to entertain the residents'
objections. "t'
The residents were frustrated by HUD's apparent indifference to their
plight and by the agency's failure to enforce federal requirements that
displaced persons be relocated in decent, safe, and sanitary housing conveniently located and at prices they can afford. 112 But this was only one of the
problems faced by the residents who were not only intimidated by SFRA
13
officials, but sometimes attacked by hoodlums as they sat in their hotels. 1
To secure decent treatment and force the government to live up to the
wording of the Housing Act, the residents formed Tenants and Owners in
Opposition to Redevelopment [hereinafter referred to as TOOR] ih the
summer of 1969. One of their first acts as a group was to file a complaint in
federal court and request an injunction against YBC until HUD and SFRA
provided decent relocation housing for the residents in compliance with the
1949 Housing Act.
At the core of this suit was the turnover formula 1 4 underlying the YBC
109. This agency is the successor to United States Housing and Home Finance Agency
(HHFA).
110. HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 102.
111. HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 103.
112. 42 U.S.C. §1455(c) (1970).

113. HARTMAN, supra note 1,at 103-04. Of the named plaintiffs in the TOOR suit, TOOR v.
HUD, No. C-69 324 (N.D. Cal. April 29, 1970) one was viciously attacked as he was returning to
his hotel the day the suit was filed, and another was subjected to several night visits in his hotel
room by an Agency relocation worker who wanted him to sign a statement that he had found
adequate relocation housing and no longer wished to be associated with the lawsuit. Another
resident was beaten in his own hotel by a drunken security guard hired by SFRA; he was later
awarded $1200 in damages against the Agency as a result of his injuries.
114. Hartman has described the term turnover in the following manner:
"Turnover" is an incredible piece of statistical legerdemain. The game involves
estimating the frequency with which an occupied unit is vacated and reoccupied. If it
is assumed that on the average all residential hotel rooms are vacated and reoccupied

once every three months, a "turnover factor" of 4 then is applied to get the annual
number of vacancies, and to project available vacancies over a five-year period a
turnover factor of 20 is applied. Based on this reasoning, the Agency estimated that
over a five-year period no less than 30,000 vacant low-rent hotel rooms would be
available for occupancy by YBC displacees. (footnote omitted)
HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 100-01.
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relocation plan. SFRA's relocation plans called for only 276 units of new
housing to be built for the 4,000 persons who would be displaced by the
project. These units would be located in a public housing project for senior
citizens placed well away from the YBC Central Blocks reserved for the
convention center complex. Aside from the inconvenient location of the
planned units and the resistance of its members to public housing, TOOR
argued that 276 units simply were not enough to house all of the people who
would be displaced. Furthermore, San Francisco lacked sufficient reserves
of low-cost housing to accommodate these people elsewhere in the city.
Judge Weigel of the federal court agreed. In December 1969, he issued
the first restraining order against the SFRA, temporarily halting relocation
and demolition activities. The judge concluded that:
[T]he record shows that at this very moment there is not adequate
relocation housing in San Francisco which meets the requirements
of the [1949 Housing] Act and is available for persons yet to be
displaced from the Project Area. . . . The statute make[s] it
abundantly clear that Congress intended residents of blighted
1 15
areas to be beneficiaries, not victims, of . . . urban renewal.
To the SFRA, the judge's order was viewed as stopping state court eviction
proceedings against tenants who failed to move within the 90-day period set
by the relocation plan. Agency workers continued to visit site residents four,
five, and six times a day in an effort to persuade them to move
"voluntarily."
In April 1970, Judge Weigel handed down an injunction. After a few
more skirmishes, SFRA offered to give the YBC residents "superpriority"
for public housing. This situation was unacceptable to the residents. Not
only did they resist relocating into public housing, they were adamant in
their refusal to secure housing by "bumping"other poor persons who had
been waiting for admission to public housing. As a compromise, the director
of the SFRA signed a consent decree in November 1970 committing the
SFRA to build or rehabilitate 1,500-1,800 units of low-rent housing anywhere in San Francisco within three years for the use of the YBC residents.
This commitment was not taken seriously by SFRA, however; by August
1972, only 11 units had been completed.1 16
The turnover concept is misleading and invalid in that it confuses normal mobility from one
unit to another with true vacancies. San Francisco, far from having 30,000 excess low-rent
vacancies, has long had a housing shortage in low-rent units. In 1967, some 100,000 low-income

households were competing for 70,000 low-income housing units. SAN FRANCISCO DEP'T OF
CITY PLANNING, MINORITY GROUP HOUSING PROBLEMS 12 (1967). There is no evidence that the
situation improved from 1967 through the early 1970's.
115. Concerning the Court's Decision on PendingMotions, statement accompanying Findings and Conclusions on Motion for Preliminary Injunction: Orders on Motions for Dismissal
and Summary Judgment, TOOR v. HUD, No. C-69 324 (N.D. Cal., Apr. 29, 1970), in HARTman, supra note 1, at 128.
116. HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 145-46. According to a high city official who knew the
director well, "He was damned if he was going to build those units. He never believed the Feds
would make him." Quoted in Herb Caen, San Francisco Chronicle, July 23, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
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In spite of SFRA's foot-dragging, Judge Weigel lifted his injunction. He
did, however, retain jurisdiction over both the implementation of the consent decree and several hotels within the project area. These were held as
temporary "hostages" until the 1,500-1,800 replacement units were
completed.
TOOR waited half a year and then returned to court to file for a second
preliminary injunction, citing SFRA's lack of progress in producing the
promised units. TOOR also protested the Housing Authority's withdrawal
of the "superpriority" status of the YBC residents. 117 At the same time
HUD suddenly announced it would review the YBC relocation plan. HUD
was primarily interested in the re-use of the land, but the YBC litigation
posed an embarrassment. HUD's study of the YBC relocation plan resulted
in a report which concluded: "There are not now nor will there be,
sufficient rehousing resources to allow the relocation of Yerba Buena Center
residents to continue unabated." 118
SFRA submitted a refined, updated relocation plan. HUD rejected it in
January 1972. A second re-revised version was also refused as "lacking
clarity." Judge Weigel began to express doubts that SFRA would produce
the 1,500-1,800 units by the November 1973 deadline.
In August 1972, SFRA proposed to break the deadlock by using city hotel
taxes to subsidize -the YBC relocation housing because federal rent supple9 Finally, in
ment funds were insufficient to cover the city's obligation. 11
October 1972, SFRA received HUD's approval of a YBC relocation plan,
and in May 1973, TOOR and SFRA signed an agreement assuring TOOR
that SFRA would develop 400 low-rent housing units on four YBC sites in
addition to the 1,500-1,800 units already promised. In exchange, TOOR
dropped its lawsuit and agreed to extend the deadline for the 1,500-1,800
housing units to November 1974. Judge Weigel approved this agreement in
July 1973 and dismissed the TOOR suit.
By dropping its lawsuit, TOOR surrendered any leverage it might have
had with SFRA. This may account in part for SFRA's failure to complete
the promised 2,000 units of low-rent replacement housing as of March
1974.
117. The withdrawal of the "superpriority" status resulted from the ongoing feud between
the Housing Authority and SFRA. The Housing Authority resented this policy because it meant
denying housing to persons already on Housing Authority waiting lists. Essentially, the Housing Authority got tired of taking the heat for SFRA. HARTMAN. supra note 1, at 142-44.
118. Report to the Court by U.S. Dept. of HUD, TOOR v. HUD, No. C-69 324 (N.D. Cal.,

filed Aug. 24, 1971), in HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 144-45.
119. There is at least some inherent fairness in this scheme. Let the hotels which would
benefit from the increased convention business YBC was supposed to attract to San Francisco
bear some of the burden of providing housing for those displaced by the project. Of course, the
tourists who stay in the hotels will eventually wind up paying the taxes, but they too may be
considered among the possible beneficiaries of YBC.
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C. Comparisons: Yerba Buena and the West End
The record in Yerba Buena is similar to that of the West End in several
respects. As in the West End, the condition of the housing in the YBC site
varied, but a large portion of the residential hotels in Yerba Buena constituted decent and sound housing, and still more were capable of rehabilitation. Of the 118 worst housing units in mid-1964, as seen by the San
Francisco Public Welfare Commission, only five were located in the area
20
slated for redevelopment. 1
Because most the YBC residents were elderly and lived on fixed, relatively low incomes, they had great difficulty financially and psychologically in
adjusting to the loss of their neighborhood. Although no psychological
studies were made of the YBC residents comparable to tlose of the West
Enders, there is every indication that the grief responses manifested by the
West Enders would also be typical of the old men displaced from South of
Market. 121
As in the West End, the displaced residents received little or no help from
the redevelopment agency; indeed, they were viewed as a nuisance rather
than as proper objects of governmental assistance. The SFRA may have
applied more intense pressure to the YBC residents in an attempt to move
them out of the area more quickly than the Boston agency found necessary.
For example:
By mid-1969, the Agency had acquired 44 percent of the land in
the project area. On taking over hotels, the Agency adopted a 'no
vacancy' policy, designed to keep up pressure on residents to
move out of the area; a further consequence was to turn hotels
into lonely, partially occupied, intimidating and dangerous places,
hastening the departure of remaining residents. Often displacement was carried out by private owners in anticipation of Agency
takeover of their properties, which meant giving almost no notice
122
to residents.
The SFRA's activities aimed at hastening the departure of the residents
caused the deterioration of South of Market to accelerate. Until the time
came for relocation and demolition of hotels, the SFRA contracted for their
outside management:
Old-time hotel staff, who performed important and friendly functions in the lives of the old people, were replaced by often insensitive and incompetent clerks and maintenance personnel ...
Heat and hot water were shut off because of 'boiler problems';
lobby doors were kept locked and residents admitted only upon
120. HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 96-97.
121. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
122. HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 102. To compare the West Enders' experience, see text
accompanying notes 89-93 supra. See also Redevelopment Agency v. Del-Camp Invs., Inc., 38
Cal. App. 3d 836, 113 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1974).
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showing identification; linens were unavailable and maid service
terminated; hall toilets were locked; comfortable lobby chairs
were replaced by benches and camp chairs; mail and messages got
lost; rubbish stood uncollected; desk clerks and security guards
drank, slept on the job, and were insolent to and on occasions
physically abused residents. 123
Unlike the totally unorganized West Enders, the YBC residents did
organize to some extent to fight back. But most of the YBC residents were
old, and many were in poor health, so militant activities were precluded.
TOOR was a fairly small group, and it conducted its protest activities
mainly in the courts. TOOR did attempt to link up with people in other
redevelopment project areas to broaden its base of support. It was generally
an unsuccessful attempt, however, largely because of the interlocking nature
of local financing arrangements for urban renewal projects.12 4 Organizations
in other redevelopment areas were reluctant to oppose Yerba Buena Center,
because its tax increment revenues were needed to finance new low-cost
housing projects in their own areas.125
As in the West End, residents displaced from South of Market were
forced to pay increased housing costs after relocation. The median monthly
rent in the South of Market area prior to relocation was $45; after relocation
it was $64, an increase of over 40 percent. Almost everyone experienced a
rent increase-some as high as $50 and more per month. One study of
persons displaced from the YBC project area between December 1969 and
December 1972 showed that of the 250 displaced persons for whom rental
information was available, 87 percent experienced a rent increase, and the
median rent increase was $36 a month.126
In both the West End and South of Market areas, the destruction of
low-rent housing without building an equal number of low-rent units as
replacements will lead to ever-spiraling rents in the coming years. For
persons living on low fixed incomes of around $200 and less a month, as the
South of Market residents were, an added rent burden of even a few dollars
is catastrophic, forcing corresponding cuts in their budgets for food, medical
care, transportation, and other necessities of life.
Very few of the YBC residents received relocation adjustment payments,
123. HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 105.
124. See text accompanying notes 20-29 supra.

125. A typical threat, publicized in the February 4, 1970, San Francisco Examiner:

The people of the Western Addition [another redevelopment project in San

Francisco] can forget about new low cost housing projects in their area unless the
planned $200 million Yerba Buena conyention complex South of Market gets built
fast.
That warning was sounded yesterday by M. Justin Herman, executive director of
the Redevelopment Agency.
HARTMAN,

supra note 1, at 113.

126. Study by Arthur D. Little, Inc. and URS Research Company of Redevelopment
Agency Records, cited in HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 116-17.
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although the 1970 Uniform Relocation Act 2 7 [the Act] provides for payment to tenants relocated by an urban renewal project of a maximum of
$1,000 per year for four years ($83 per month) to close the gap between
what the displaced person can afford and the cost of decent replacement
housing. The Act assumes that displaced persons can spend one-fourth of
their income on rent; 128 it is not clear that this is so. If the median rent prior
to relocation in YBC was $45, a fair number of people were paying less than
that. Without a listing of the income and rent payments of all the residents, it
is impossible to draw conclusions, but one may surmise that at least some of
the residents may have been paying less than one-fourth of their income on
rent, either through necessity or through choice. This means that even if
relocation assistance made up the difference between -the one-fourth figure
and the actual rent increase, some people would be forced to allocate more
of their income to rent payments than they had previously done. In YBC,
was
one-fifth of those interviewed stated that the relocation assistance
129
insufficient to cover the actual amount of the rental increase.
Furthermore, as the subsidy only lasts a short time, the few who do
receive it are faced with the necessity of a second move to cheaper housing
when the payments cease. Even assuming a less expensive location can be
found--obviously invalid in San Francisco's tight housing market-the new
dwelling is highly likely to be even less adequate for the needs of the
displaced person. For this second move, there is not even the possibility of
relocation assistance; thus funds needed for moving, for cleaning and
security deposits, and for furnishing the apartment must all come out of the
displaced person's already over-extended budget. The SFRA's response to
the plight of the YBC residents after relocation payments run out was typical
of that agency's concern with the people living in the project area: "Life is
short." 30
Granting that there may be variations among redevelopment projects and
redevelopment agencies, and that it may be unfair to generalize from a
sample of only two redevelopment projects, certain similarities must be
noted. The people living in the project area generally derive no benefit from
the improvement which displaces them. As in Boston's West End and San
Francisco's South of Market areas, the residents are usually quite poor. In
these, as well as other redevelopment projects, the new luxury housing,
shopping centers, and convention center complexes are obviously not built
127. The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of
1970, 42 U.S.C. §4624 (1970).
128. In Baltimore, for example, 71 percent of all low-income households had housing costs

in excess of 25 percent of income. Of these, 56 percent were nonetheless living in substandard
housing. Data from an extensive 1969 survey subsequently confirmed by the 1970 Census.
GRIGSBY & ROSENBURG, URBAN HouSING POLICY 259 (Table 12.1), 301-04 (1975).

129. HARTMAN, supra note I, at 117.

130. Id. at 118.
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for their use. They therefore feel alienated as a result of being pushed aside
for the benefit of other groups.131
The comment of the YBC's developer perhaps best sums up the attitude
of the redevelopment agencies-the agencies charged with making relocation "an opportunity, rather than a hardship":132
After all this is a world of the survival of the fittest. And what
bothers me is that some of the people opposed to this project are
trying to protect the weaker members of society
from the
133
stronger. This is in conflict with the law of the land.
1.

The Economic Aspects

The studies of Boston's West End and San Francisco's Yerba Buena
Center point up the disproportionate share of the burdens of urban renewal
which are visited upon the segment of society least able to afford them. Both
in terms of financial hardship and psychological damage, poor people suffer
excruciatingly when an area is redeveloped. In theory, the financial costs
may be ameliorated to some extent by relocation assistance; but, as demonstrated by the experiences of those displaced from Yerba Buena, the payments fall far short of covering the expenses incurred.
As for the psychological damage caused by being wrenched out of
familiar surroundings and social relationships, the displaced persons receive
no financial compensation at all on the theory that monetary damages cannot
be assessed for these injuries. Of course, the fact that some detriments
caused by relocation do not lend themselves to ready conversion into dollars
must not detract from the fact that others do. Besides, when one considers
the ephemeral and highly subjective nature of certain kinds of harm for
which the law of torts readily grants monetary compensation (e.g., pain and
suffering, 134 loss of consortium, 135 emotional distress, 136) the basis for
131. "The relocation process increases social and civic tension by confirming feelings of
the persons adversely affected that they have little or no control over their own lives, and that
they are being shoved aside for others whom they feel society values more highly." THE
CITIZEN'S HOUSING TASK FORCE, FIRST REPORT TO MAYOR JOHN F. SHELLEY 3 (San Francisco,

Oct. 19, 1967). Proper analysis of the problems of just compensation for the displaced population must take account of the demoralization cost. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness:
Comments on the EthicalFoundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165

(1967).
132. LINDBLOOM & FARRAH. supra note 3, at 109.

133. Lyman Jee, developer for the Yerba Buena Center Central Blocks, 1972, quoted in
HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 123. Those who might think that Mr. Jee was confusing the law of
the jungle with the law of the land should ponder the fact that only three years later, none other

than the liberal and fair minded California Supreme Court validated this harsh thesis. See
Community Redev. Agency v. Abrams, 15 Cal. 3d 813, 543 P.2d 905, 126 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1975)
(elderly druggist's inability to relocate his business and transfer his goodwill held to be a result
of old age and physical infirmities and, hence, non-compensable).
134. See, e.g., Culbertson v. Haynes, 127 F. Supp. 837 (D.N.D. 1955); Shiers v. Cowgill,
157 Neb. 265, 59 N.W.2d 407 (1953); Kenwood Tire Co. v. Speckman, 92 Ind. App. 419, 176
N.E. 29 (1931).
135. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765
(1974).
136. See, e.g., Alabama G.S.R. Co. v. Hill, 93 Ala. 514,9 So. 722 (1891) (loss of fecundity);
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (emotional trauma and
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offhandedly labelling the losses involved in relocation as incapable of
conversion into a monetary equivalent erodes rapidly. Moreover, the
psychological costs of urban renewal should not be ignored since some of
the benefits claimed for the program are also psychological, such as pride in
a more beautiful city or lack of necessity to view slums while commuting.
In spite of the real harm caused by urban renewal, the program continues
to be attractive to communities. 137 One would expect then that economic and
social benefits resulting from urban renewal must offset the suffering of the
individuals who are displaced from the project area. Scientific economic
analysis of redevelopment projects, while rare, 138 has occasionally been
39
attempted. 1
One must begin such an analysis by sorting out the economic benefits and
costs of redevelopment. An absolute benefit-a true creation of economic
value-results from the assembly of land into larger parcels by a redevelopresulting physical injury from witnessing death of child by its mother); Sullivan v. City and
County of San Francisco, 95 Cal. App. 2d 745, 214 P.2d 82 (1950) (loss of desire for sexual
intercourse and impotency); Domencio v. Kaherl, 160 Me. 182, 200 A.2d 844 (1964) (fear of
injury to unborn child); Goebel v. Fleming, 13 Tenn. App. 473 (1931) (fear of death).
137. In Los Angeles County alone, redevelopment projects have commenced at an everincreasing rate. A study of base years (the time at which the property tax base within the limits
of the project area is frozen) reveals that from a low of I to 3 projects per year in the county in
the late 1950's and early 1960's, the 1970's have brought a veritable avalanche of redevelopment
projects:
9
1970-71
12
1971-72
1972-73
18
1973-74
19
9
1974-75
1975-76
6

Los

ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSOR, TAX RATE AREA UNIT, MAPPING SERVICES, REPORT ON
COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT AGENCIES (Feb. 18, 1976).

An attempt by Santa Catalina Island (a small island off the southern California coast) to turn
itself into one large redevelopment project was thwarted by the California Attorney General's
office. Interview with Norman Flette, Deputy Attorney General, State of California, Los
Angeles, Calif., Aug. 11, 1976.
138. "Yet rarely has [urban] renewal been subjected to a vigorous and impartial analysis of
its real costs and real benefits." REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORP. WITH RTKL ASSOCIATES, INC.,
THE FUTURE OF LOCAL URBAN REDEVELOPMENT, A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITY POLICY MAKERS 14
(1975) [hereinafter cited as FUTURE]. This report and its companion volumes by the same
authors, EVALUATING LOCAL URBAN RENEWAL PROJECTS' A SIMPLIFIED MANUAL [hereinafter
cited as EVALUATING] and GUIDELINES FOR URBAN RENEWAL LAND DISPOSITION [hereinafter
cited as GUIDELINES], are the product of a 22-person, 15-month, HUD funded analysis of more
than 70 urban renewal projects in 22 cities. Self-described as ". . . one of the most detailed
studies ever undertaken of urban renewal during its 25-year history." FUTURE at 2, the authors
of the report reach their conclusion that "the benefits of renewal have more than outweighed its
costs." FUTURE at 4, without presenting a single quantitative example of a cost or a benefit
anywhere in the three-volume study. It should be noted that the authors of these three volumes
are hardly disinterested observers of urban renewal. Real Estate Research Corp. has performed
numerous market studies relating to redeveloped land use for both private and public sector
customers, GUIDELINES at 122. RTKL Associates, Inc., an architectural firm, has participated
in federally-funded urban renewal projects such as Charles Center in downtown Baltimore. L.
REDSTONE, THE NEW DOWNTOWNS 48, 75-77 (1976) [hereinafter cited as REDSTONE].
139. See, e.g., Rothenberg, Urban Renewal Programs, in MEASURING BENEFITS OF GovERNMENT INVESTMENTS 292 (R. DORFMAN ED. 1965); J. ROTHENBERG, ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF
URBAN RENEWAL (1967) [hereinafter cited as ROTHENBERG]; S. MESSNER, A BENEFIT-COST
ANALYSIS OF URBAN REDEVELOPMENT (1967) [hereinafter cited as MESSNER]. All three of these
studies were funded by non-government sources.
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ment agency.140 If nearby land increases in value because of the improvements constructed in the project area, the "spillover" (increase in value due
to the project) is another absolute benefit. 14 1 In contrast to such absolute
benefits, many "benefits" claimed by proponents of urban renewal are
really only redistributional.A redistributional benefit is one which would
have accrued elsewhere if the same resources had been employed in another
location. Such redistributional "benefits" include any attraction into the
project area of commercial, industrial, or institutional investment dollars;
any shift of municipal spending into the area; and any federal assistance
attracted by the project. Rothenberg explains why it is misleading to count
such redistributional components of urban renewal as benefits:
The value of the demolished property is, of course, a cost of the
project and will be included as part of the net project cost. But
inclusion of the value of the new structures and other improvements as offsetting benefits is improper. It implies that the particular investment in reproducible capital represents a net social
gain. This would be true only if its opportunity cost were zero,
that is, if it represented the output of resources that would not
otherwise have been used. Thus, to include the investment, one
would have to argue that the resources used up would not otherwise have been used to produce housing elsewhere, or indeed,
142
anything else of value.
It is correspondingly improper to count as benefits any increase in assessed
43
valuation for tax purposes due to redevelopment project improvements. 1
140. "Thus, assembly by eminent domain enables land in the redevelopment site to be used
in large enough units to internalize neighborhood externalities- either for coordination only or
for integrated use." ROTHENBERG, supra note 139, at 118.
141. ROTHENBERG. supra note 139, 119:
When redevelopment has brought about such [higher land] use, the 'improvement' in
this neighborhood increases the attractiveness of real estate in the adjoining neigh-

borhoods, thereby increasing their value. Since the quality of housing services stems
in part from the neighborhood, this spillover effect is a true nonpecuniary (real)
external effect.

However, Messner considers spillover effects to be redistributional rather than absolute.
MESSNER, supra note 139, at 66. [Wallin and Dilkes present a situation which is perhaps best
described as negative redistributional spillover:

Illustrative of this is the demise of property values on Spring Street in Los Angeles.
Much of this came as a result of the relocation of the City's Financial Center to the
area in and around the Bunker Hill Redevelopment Project. Since the Agency insists
the development around Bunker Hill came as a result of the Projects' [sic] "peripheral effects," the losses on Spring Street must also be the responsibility of the Agency.
WALLIN & DILKES. supra note 23, at 13. As one might imagine, computation of spillover

benefits poses problems of economic methodology. See ROTHENBERG. supra note 139, at
138-42, 185-86.
142. ROTHENBERG. supra note 139, at 136.

143. Id. It is just this economically unsound miscounting of redistributional benefits which
has been enshrined in tax increment financing. As Wallin and Dilkes comment,

The appropriate formula for determining the contribution of redevelopment to increases in assessed valuation on a City, regional, or State level, is a 'net, net, net'
computation derived as follows:

Total assessed valuation:
- Less base year assessed valuation;

- Less assessed valuation increases attributable to inflation;
- Less assessed valuation from development which was already committed prior to
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The economic costs of urban redevelopment include both visible and
hidden losses. Visible costs include such items as the land writedown, the
cost of bonds issued, the taxes foregone during the redevelopment period,
the administrative expenses of the renewal agency, 144 and the cost of
mandated relocation payments. These costs can be obtained in aggregated
form for analysis. Hidden costs usually cannot be obtained in aggregated
form, but can be demonstrated when renewal projects are examined on a
case-by-case basis. The hidden costs include items such as the true cost of
household and business relocation, 145 price increases in low-income housing
as the displaced population enters the housing market, 14 6 the cost of relocated blight,14 7 losses due to precondemnation blight, 148 losses suffered by
businesses near the project, and administrative expenses borne by agencies
149
other than the redevelopment agency.
Assuming that dollar values can be obtained for as many of these costs
and benefits as possible, the next step is to compare them in a consistent
manner. An economic model of redevelopment impact developed by Brookings Institution economist Jerome Rothenberg1 50 provides the necessary
the adoption of the redevelopment plan;
- Less assessed valuation from development which would have been developed
elsewhere in the City, Region or State, but developed instead in the project area
because of project subsidies;
- Less assessed valuation which would have developed in the project area notwithstanding redevelopment;
- Less assessed valuation reduction in existing developments in the City, Region or
State competing with the project development, and declining in value because of the
impact of subsidized competition.
WVALLIN & DILKES, supra note 23, at 11-12.

144. Redevelopment agency overhead costs are visible only if accounting requirements
make them so. Finding true administrative costs has been quite difficult for projects not bound
by federal rules. See MESSNER, supra note 139, at 91-92.
145. See text accompanying notes 268-271 infra.
146.

See ROTHENBERG, supra note 139, at 224-25:

[R]edevelopment demolishes dwelling units near or at the lowest quality levels in the
housing stock and substitutes for them a smaller total number, disproportionately
located in the middle-income or upper-income level, or it substitutes nonresidential
units. Thus, although the average quality level of the housing stock is made to rise
(and its age to fall), the number of units in the lower-quality class declines while that
in the higher-quality class increases. The price (and rentals) of lower-quality units
rises, that of higher-quality units falls.
The result is that the poor wind up paying more for housing of no better quality than that from
which they were displaced, while the wealthier members of society get a windfall in the form of
a larger supply of housing stock from which to choose, with concomitantly lower prices.
147. Slum-by-slum redevelopment may lead to a never-ending chase to catch blight spread
from previous projects. ROTHENBERG, supra note 139, at 127. The Real Estate Research Corp.
found cases of slums and blight in areas that had been "renewed" only five years ago. FUTURE,
supra note 138, at 23.
148. See text accompanying notes 264-267 infra.
149. These costs are significant enough to cause administrators to seek legislative redress:
Community Redevelopment Agency proliferation in the County of Los Angeles
creates a heavy burden on assessment, auditor controller, and County Counsel
operations. Legislation should be prepared requiring CRA's to absorb the cost of the
services required, including personnel costs, to service the preparation of increment
payments, maintain records, and liaison regarding their various needs.
Letter from Harry L. Hufford, Chief Administrative Officer, County of Los Angeles to the Los
Angeles County Board of Supervisors, March 11, 1975, attachment 4-5 (copy on file at the
Pacific Law Journal).
150.

ROTHENBERG, supra note 139, at 115-97.
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framework for such comparisons. The basic method is quite straightforward: the net cost of redevelopment for a project is equal to its resource cost
minus the productivity benefits (i.e., increased land value) accruing to the

project area. 151
Table 1 presents the results of economic cost-benefit analysis of eight
redevelopment projects. 152 The Chicago projects were federally funded
under the Urban Renewal Administration: 153 the Indianapolis projects were
locally funded through a combination of property taxes and bond revenues. 5 4 The Chicago projects were residential, replacing low-income
housing with moderate to expensive housing. 55 Indianapolis Project "A"
was redeveloped as approximately 75 percent moderate-income housing;
156
Projects "B" and "G" were commercial redevelopments.
TABLE 1. COSTS AND BENEFITS.
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Costs and Benefits
(thousands of dollars)
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Gross project costs ............. 237
Initial value of land ............. 75
Total resource costs ........... T62
Benefit: increased
productivity of land ......... 27
Net cost of redevelopment ... 135
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49
589

1253
436
817

1800
210
1590

6235
1596
4639

10534
6449
4085

16761
8777
7984

29
321

30
559

183
633

239
1351

1719
2920

5016
-931

12711
-4727

The total resource costs are equal to the gross project costs minus the initial value of the land.
The benefit (increased productivity of land) value is then subtracted from the total resource costs
to demonstrate the net cost of redevelopment.
151. This is a simplification of Rothenberg's methodology, and ignores both spillover
effects and social benefits. Economic analysis admits appraisal data as well as noncash and
nonmarket transactions; the costs and benefits are adjusted for the year in which they actually
occur by means of discounting. The initial appraised value of the land is subtracted from the
gross project costs since the land is not destroyed but only removed from the market during the
redevelopment process. If a net benefit results, the computation yields a negative number for
the net cost of redevelopment.
152. Table adapted from ROTHENBERG, supra note 139, at 196 (Table XI-6), and MESSNER,

supra note 139, at 59 (Table 9), 78 (Table 13). Neither Rothenberg nor Messner computed
spillover benefits, tax costs, or any of the hidden costs of redevelopment on a project-wide
basis because of limitations of scope and funding. Relocation payments were not included as
costs because none were mandated for these projects.
153. ROTHENBERG, supra note 139, at 196.
154.

MESSNER, supra note 139, at 39-50.

155. For further discussion of the Hyde Park-Kenwood redevelopment project, see generally P. Rossi & R. DENTLER, THE POLrrlCS OF URBAN RENEWAL (1961). This neighborhood is
adjacent to the University of Chicago.
The upper-middle-class professors, housewives, and professional men (both white
and Negro) . . . were mostly people who were going to remain in the community
...
. The persons who were to be moved out of the community and whose apartments and homes were to be torn down were usually lower-income Negroes ....
Wilson, Planningand Politics: Citizen Participationin Urban Renewal, in URBAN RENEWAL:
THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 412 (J. Wilson ed. 1966).
156. MESSNER, supra note 139, at 102-05.

660
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From an economist's point of view, only the two largest projects, Lake
Meadows and Hyde Park "A", yielded real benefits, that is a net positive
economic value. In the six other projects, resources were squandered. The
input of money resulted only in a loss of economic value. From the
taxpayers' standpoint, there was a net loss in every case, because gross
project costs, paid for by taxes, exceeded land productivity benefits for
every project. This is not at all unusual: "The costs are generally much
greater than the land gains. Thus, despite the downward bias of the gains
figures, redevelopment is not generally justified in terms of land productivity alone." 1 5 7 Obviously, great caution is in order when city officials
announce an impending redevelopment project and proceed to justify it on
the basis of economic benefits alone. This is especially true where the
"benefits" cited are entirely redistributional in nature, such as the
"privilege" of having a shopping center in one part of town rather than in
another part. At the very least the burden of proof as to economic justifica1 58
tion of urban renewal belongs to the proponents of redevelopment.
Since the economic benefits are questionable at best, one must investigate
further to see what other benefits might result to justify the use of the
redevelopment process. Social benefits are frequently cited as a major goal
of redevelopment; 159 social and economic benefits are often commingled as
if similar and subject to measurement on the same scale. 160 Social benefits
are often listed as by-products of urban renewal slum clearance, 16 1 and are
also alleged to result from urban renewal housing construction, which
directly or indirectly expands the pool of decent, safe, and sanitary housing
162
for low-income persons.
Many of these claimed social benefits are arguable. 163 Regardless of the
merits of the arguments advanced by urban renewal proponents when
redevelopment is used to clean up slums, where the land condemned is
157. ROTHENBERG, supra note 139, at 195.
158. However, it has been roundly ignored by these proponents. See note 138 supra. Yet
cost-benefit analysis is neither a stranger nor a newcomer to other government projects. Prest

& Turvey, Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey, 75 ECON. J. 683, 705 (1965).
159. Some commentators believe that the urban renewal program must ultimately stand or
fall on how significant the social benefits are. ROTHENBERG, supra note 139, at 175.
160. EVALUATING. supra note 138, at 59-66.
161. Examples of social benefits include decreased crime and disease; decreased need for
municipal police, fire, sanitation, and health services, and even decreased educational needs.

162. Urban renewal can, of course, directly expand the pool of decent, safe, and sanitary

housing for low-income persons by building same. However, even proponents of the program
agree that not much of this has occurred. An average of 13,525 housing units per year have been

built nationally on renewal sites from 1950 through 1974, of which, over 40 percent are for

middle and upper-income families. FUTURE, supra note 138, at 13. Construction of higher

quality dwellings for higher-income persons indirectly expands the pool of good housing for

lower-income persons through the "filtering" process, a term which refers to the use of a
dwelling by a succession of households each having a successively lower income. W. GRIGSBY
& L. ROSENBERG, URBAN HOUSING POLICY, 196 (1975).
163. While such arguments are beyond the scope of this article, it must be noted that this
topic has been pursued by other writers. W. GRIGSBY & L. ROSENBERG. URBAN HOUSING
POLICY. 195-210 (1975); J. JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 270-90
(1961); See ROTHENBERG. supra note 139, at 160-75.
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neither a slum before redevelopment nor a residential area after redevelopment, there are no social benefits. Aesthetic benefits-such as increased
open space, the opportunity for architectural master planning, and the goal
of a prettier city-thus seem to be the only real benefits of urban renewal.
This is a vitally important conclusion, since urban renewal is now primarily (if not entirely) used for non-slum, non-residential projects. Yerba Buena
is only one example of modern-day urban renewal; the unfortunate Mr.
Morris is another. Urban renewal proponents recommend commercial uses
and "land banking" as the goal of redevelopment projects; 164 and nonslum, nonresidential projects clearly are the focus of redevelopment under
tax increment financing. In Los Angeles County, where tax increment
5
funding is widely used, this device has not built a single residence. 16
Because tax increment financing is viewed by urban renewal proponents
166
as the solution to long-term funding problems of redevelopment agencies
and is now used by nearly a dozen states, 167 it may be instructive to look at a
current project of this type. The city of Santa Monica in southern California
is considering starting a redevelopment project to renovate its central business district and make it competitive with a nearby enclosed shopping center
68
mall-also a redevelopment project-which opened recently.1
D.

Santa Monica

The Santa Monica downtown redevelopment project is planned simply
and candidly as a means of providing effective business competition to other
nearby shopping centers. It is envisioned as a covered shopping plaza,
containing two major department stores, 290,000 square feet of retail shops,
and two parking garages accommodating 2,200 cars. The project is to be
located on a two-block site, immediately south of an existing three-block
169
uncovered shopping mall and north of a Sears Roebuck department store.
The merchants in the existing mall divided on the benefits of the proposed
project: some felt that the new shopping center would take away their
164.
165.
166.

See FUTURE, supra note 138, at 35; GUIDELINES, supra note 138, at 99, 110.
WALLINS & DILKES, supra note 23, at 3-10.
FUTURE, supra note 138, at 36-37.

167. Id. at 37.
168. See notes 4-5 supra.

169. L.A. Times (West Side), Nov. 9, 1975, §11, at 11, col. 1. One description of the
proposed project reads as follows:

The Santa Monica Mall will serve as a major gateway to a new retail complex

proposed for a 10-acre site directly south of the [existing] mall. Two department
stores and various retail shops are arranged around a two-level protected pedestrian

shopping street, continuing the existing mall across Broadway by a pedestrian overpass into an active plaza space with small shops and places for people to sit...
The protected pedestrian street . . . funnels down through a bazaar-type shopping

street leading into a central mall. There are department stores, shops, eating places,
and entertainment areas, as well as trees and grass arranged on several levels within
an air-conditioned glazed shopping arcade. ...

REDSTONE, supra note 138, at 288. It should be pointed out that the existing mall already
contains trees and places for people to sit. Moreover, since it is located two blocks from the

Pacific Ocean, air conditioning is not required.
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business while others believed the addition of new stores
would attract more
170
shoppers who would spill over into the older stores.
The present mall is strung out along three blocks and includes jewelry
shops, camera shops, clothing establishments, shoe stores, drugstores, book
stores, inexpensive restaurants, and various other small businesses. Except
for the nearby Sears store and two smaller department stores near the mall,
there is no large department store in the area. The mall area is paved and
contains tree-shaded benches. In the summer, Santa Monica is almost
always blessed with a cool breeze from the nearby ocean, and many people
enjoy promenading on the mall or just relaxing. 171 Given the wide variety of
stores, it is reasonable to expect that a fair amount of shopping accompanies
these leisure activities.
Nevertheless, Sam Porter, the executive vice president of the Santa
Monica Chamber of Commerce, stated that a new shopping center is vital to
Santa Monica:
We just have to keep pace. We don't know yet how much our
business community will be hurt by the Fox Hills Mall, but look at
it this way: a lot of people from Santa Monica are going to go over
there to see what the new mall is like. They will probably end up
spending $50 and that means $50 less spent at a store in Santa
Monica. 172
An additional benefit of the proposed shopping center in Mr. Porter's view
would be the elimination of less desirable places on the existing mall. 173 Put
somewhat more bluntly, the Santa Monica Chamber of Commerce (or at
least its executive vice president) has determined that certain businesses do
not constitute an asset to the city. Therefore, their owners should be
economically exterminated.
Santa Monica's city manager, James Williams, announced that one of his
major goals in 1976 would be to purchase land and issue bonds to get
downtown redevelopment under way: "The main point of the downtown
redevelopment is that it will increase the tax base on its completion in fall of
'78.9"174
From the beginning, the project generated controversy because of its
reliance on tax increment financing. The proposed plan called for Santa
Monica to issue about $15 million in lease-revenue bonds to pay its share of
the cost of the project-acquisition of land (some of which was already
170. L.A. Times (West Side), Jan. 8, 1976, §7, at 1, col. 5.
171.

This statement is based on personal observations of one of the authors, who often

shops in the existing Santa Monica Mall.
172.

L.A. Times (West Side), Jan. 8, 1976, §7, at 1, col. 5.

173. Id.
174. Id., Jan. 1, 1976, §8, at 1, col. 1. In view of the long planning and execution time
generally required for redevelopment projects, the city manager's estimate of less than 3 years
to complete the project is likely to prove unduly optimistic.
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owned by the city), demolition of existing buildings, relocation of tenants,
site improvement, and construction of parking garages. The major portion
of the 10-acre site would be sold to the developer for $3.6 million. 175 The
developer would then spend $37.2 million for construction and fixtures. The
lease-revenue bonds would be paid off through the increased property tax
76
revenues the project is expected to generate. 1
When the project came before the Redevelopment Agency (whose members do double duty by also sitting as the City Council), one lone member
opposed the-development on the ground that the contract with the developer
did not provide adequate revenue guarantees to the city. 177 He may have
recalled the example of Redondo Beach. 171 This same member was later to
be the sole advocate of presenting the redevelopment plan to the electorate,
reasoning that the lease-revenue bonds were likely to become general
obligation bonds 179 and thus required two-thirds approval by the voters. The
rest of the council quickly squelched both proposals. An additional opponent of the project, a taxpayer, termed the scheme welfare for business. He
charged that Santa Monica's actual financial subsidy of the shopping center
180
complex over a 25-year period would reach $31.8 million.
On November 9, 1975, a public hearing on the proposed Santa Monica
Downtown Redevelopment Plan was announced for December 9, 1975. 11
As California law requires a general plan to be adopted before approval is
given to a downtown commercial redevelopment plan, the Citizens Advisory Committee prepared the document, one feature of which is a housing
plan. The committee included programs to provide federal rent-assistance
subsidies to low-income families, interest subsidies for home purchases by
low-income families, a ban on housing discrimination, and requirements
that developers of multi-family units provide low-cost housing within the
development.' 82
At public hearings held shortly thereafter, Santa Monica residents
criticized the housing plan. They objected not only to the city's financial
involvement in assistance programs for low and moderate-income homeowners wishing to rehabilitate or improve their property, but also to a
requirement for suitable and acceptable replacement housing for people
before they are removed by the project. In general, the residents opposed the
idea of low-income housing in Santa Monica,183 a middle and upper-middleincome community.
175. Simple arithmetic reveals that the chosen developer is being subsidized by some $10
million plus.
176. L.A. Times (West Side), Nov. 9, 1975, §11, at 11, col. 2.

177. Id.
178.
179.

See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
L.A. Times (West Side), Jan. 18, 1976, §8, at 1, col. 1.

180. Id.
181.
182.
183.

Id., Nov. 9, 1975, §11, at 11, col. 1.
Id., Nov. 20, 1975, §8, at 1, col. 3.
Id. See Note 97 supra.
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Meanwhile, the Santa Monica Housing Authority and the City CouncilRedevelopment Agency differed over proposed senior citizen housing in a
separate redevelopment project. The Council's solution was both quick and
instructive. It declared itself to be commissioners of the city Housing
Authority, and in an emergency ordinance (effective immediately upon
passage), created a Housing Commission composed of the members of the
former Authority. The new Commission's duties consisted of advising the
Council and performing other assigned tasks. The Authority's "might" and
"powerful" powers were declared to only be safe in the hands of elected
184
officials.
The Planning Commission then recommended a modified general plan
housing element for approval, which provided tax incentives for construction of low-cost housing and called for seeking federal funds for rent
subsidies, low-cost rehabilitation loans and low mortgage rates. Deleted
were provisions calling for replacement housing for persons displaced by the
new project, recognition of municipal responsibility in low and moderateincome housing development, and an inclusionary ordinance that required
apartment developers to set aside a certain number of units for low and
moderate income renters. 185 In general, the language of the housing element
was softened to remove terms of a mandatory nature.
When the City Council considered the general plan housing element, it
restored some of its provisions and modified language or added provisions
to call for retaining a housing mix in Santa Monica. The Council also
attempted to provide for orderly transitions between different land uses and
to eliminate nonconforming land uses in residential areas. Lastly, the Couna program committing the city to housing rehabilitacil specifically required
186
tion on a local basis.
In early January, the Planning Commission made the required finding that
the downtown shopping center project conformed to Santa Monica's general
adopted an ordinance setting forth the
plan. 187 The City Council then 188
Downtown Redevelopment Plan.
City Manager Williams recommended that the plan be adopted to provide
a source of revenue. He maintained that the plan was necessary if Santa
Monica were to maintain quality services. Mayor Nat Trives, heading up an
escalated campaign for the project just before a crucial public hearing before
the South Coast Regional Zone Conservation Commission, stated that the
184. L.A. Times (West Side), Nov. 30, 1975, §11, at 1, col. 6.

185. Id., Dec. 7, 1975, §11, at 3, col. 1.
186.
187.
188.

Id., Dec. 21, 1975, §9, at 6, col. 1.
Id., Jan. 8, 1976, §7, at 1, col. 5.
Id., Jan. 18, 1976, §8, at 1, col. 1.
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downtown project "is vital to the city's future and will not require the use of
Santa Monica taxpayer money. 189" Furthermore, the mayor asserted that
"the property taxes resulting from the new buildings financed by private
investment will be used to pay public costs" and the project would produce
"at least $500,000 a year" in funds which would be used to improve the
90
quality of life in Santa Monica.1
When the regional coastal commission unveiled its report in early February, it made no recommendation on the wisdom of approving the project,
now alleged to cost $60 million. Instead, it questioned the appropriateness
of a new shopping center two blocks from the beach and exhibited concern
that the enclosed mall should take advantage of Santa Monica's cool climate
191
and eliminate air conditioning as an energy conservation measure.
At the next public hearing, held on February 9, 1976, Citizens on
Shopping Center Taxation [hereinafter referred to as COST] asked the South
Coast Regional Commission to table a decision on the city's permit application until a public vote on the bonds could be held. 192 COST advocated
inclusion of such a measure on the June 1976 ballot. 193 Further opposition to
the redevelopment project centered on contentions that the mall would be
wasteful of energy, unaesthetic, growth-inducing, and would increase traffic congestion and raise rents. 194 At the next hearing on February 23, COST
again asked that the city's permit application be tabled until a vote could be
had on the bonds and again voiced opposition on the same grounds the group
had earlier specified. 195 To complaints that the project would waste energy
and increase traffic congestion, City Manager Williams replied that the
project would actually use less energy because the complex would be
96
enclosed and that any impact on traffic congestion would be minimal. 1
On March 8, 1976, the regional coastal commission staff recommended
approval of the shopping center, subject to certain conditions. First, public
rooftop facilities (e.g., a restaurant, budget cafeteria, roof garden) would be
made an integral part of the development. Next, residents who would be
displaced must be offered a choice of housing in Santa Monica, and, if
189. Id., Jan. 29, 1976, §8, at 1, col. 1.
190. Id. His Honor neglected to mention that even if the project is successful, any tax
increments generated by the increase in value of the land will simply be assigned to the
redevelopment agency for payment, at its discretion, of its debts. The revenues to the city from
the project area will remain fixed at the pre-redevelopment rate, while the cost of providing
services to the project area will increase due to growth of the area (assuming the project is
successful) and normal inflation.
191. Marina News, Feb. 5, 1976, at 1.
192. Inasmuch as a redevelopment agency is theoretically a state body (even though
composed of city council members), it is beyond the reach of, or control by, a municipal
initiative or referendum election. Gibbs v. City of Napa, 59 Cal. App. 3d 148, 154, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 382, 385 (1976). Thus, an election would have value only as an advisory measure and the
redevelopment agency would be free to ignore the election results.
193. L.A. Times (West Side), Feb. 12, 1976, §7, at 9, col. 1.
194. Id.
195. Id., Feb. 26, 1976, §7, at 1, col. 6.
196. Id.
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necessary, their rent would be subsidized for the first relocation. No future
development would be permitted to block the view of the ocean and the
shoreline from the roof of the shopping center complex. An independent
firm would make a detailed analysis of the building and service systems to
determine the total energy demand. In order to conserve energy, the building must be analyzed to determine if ventilation and illumination could be
achieved without the use of fossil fuels. In addition, space must be allocated
on the site for loading and unloading passengers of public buses. Finally, the
staff called for a conceptual plan providing for pedestrian and visual access
through the block between the southwest entrance of the shopping center
and Ocean Avenue, and street level or overhead access between the shopping center and Sears store on the south and between the center and the
19 7
existing mall on the north.
The South Coast Regional Zone Conservation Commission approved the
shopping center. The height limitation condition was rewritten to make
height factors a consideration rather than a mandatory condition in future
development of the coastline. 198 On its own initiative, the Commission
specified that the permit be given immediately rather than after the other
specified conditions were met, thus enabling the city to get started samewhat faster on construction.
At least, the city hoped to get started on construction of buildings and sale
of bonds. However, pending lawsuits prevented immediate action on the
redevelopment project. The Legal Aid Foundation filed a suit on behalf of
two low-income residents of the redevelopment area alleging that there is no
blight in the project area, that seismic studies were not done, and that the
required environmental impact report was incomplete. 199 In addition to this
lawsuit, a number of appeals were filed with the state Coastal Zone Conservation Commission by opponents of the project who challenged the redevelopment scheme on a number of grounds-the project would be an
excessive user of energy, would lead to rent increases, would create traffic
congestion, was poorly designed and planned, and would be unaesthetic. In
addition, the appellants objected to the financing method (i.e., tax increment funding). 200
In late June, 1976, the state Commission endorsed the earlier action of the
South Coast Commission grating the permit, 20 1 thereby disposing of appeals to the Coastal Zone Conservation Commission. In addition to the
Legal Aid Foundation lawsuit, the city faced an additional hurdle in the
197. Id., Mar. 14, 1976, at 6, col. 2; Marina News, Mar. 11, 1976, at 1.
198. L.A. Times (West Side), Mar. 25, 1976, §8, at 1, col. 6.
199. Id. The trial court ultimately ruled that the project met the legal definition of blight
and that the city had not violated Community Redelopment Law in using public funds to finance

such a project. L.A. Times (West Side), Mar. 17, 1977, §7, at 1, col. 5.
200. Id., Apr. 11, 1976, at 8, col. 2.
201.

Id., June 20, 1976, §9, at 3, col. 3.
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form of a vote by Santa Monica residents on the financing plan. Proponents
argued that tax increment financing would be the cheapest method of
financing the shopping center because of low interest rates on the lease
revenue bonds. 202 Opponents contended that the project has dubious value to
Santa Monica residents, holds no guarantees of financial success, and
represents an improper use of public money.20 3 A simple majority was
required for approval; the voters approved the project by 54.3 percent. 20
City officials proclaimed that the shopping center, now estimated to cost
$68 million,20 5 would open for business by the fall of 1979.206
1.

Comments: MunicipalAspects

The pattern shown by the Santa Monica downtown shopping mall project
is consistent with the patterns established in Boston's West End and in
Yerba Buena. In all three cases, the area to be redeveloped was portrayed as
a slum or as blighted land. Yet, in both the West End and in Yerba Buena,
the majority of the dwelling units were not deteriorated or substandard prior
to the redevelopment agency's announcement of impending renewal. In
Santa Monica the executive vice president of the city's chamber of commerce openly stated that the raison d'etre of the redevelopment project was
to enable the Santa Monica merchants to compete more effectively with Fox
Hills Mall and that a subsidiary benefit of redeveloping the project area
would be the elimination of "less desirable places" on the existing mall.
In all three redevelopment projects, the primary interest in redeveloping
the area had absolutely nothing to do with the welfare of the people living in
the project area. Instead, the interest was entirely in upgrading the land
within the project area to some "higher and better use" to provide more tax
revenues for city coffers. In the West End, low-cost housing gave way to
luxury apartments; in YBC, low-cost housing would be replaced by a
convention center and office buildings; and in Santa Monica, small businesses and a local newspaper office would be eliminated in favor of a new
shopping center mall in a region already teeming with retail shops. In each
case, private businesses were or would be heavily subsidized by tax dollars
in order that the businesses should increase their profits, increase the
assessed value of the land, and theoretically generate tax increment revenues
202. Id., Aug. 19, 1976, §7,'at 1, col. 5.
203. Id., Oct. 31, 1976, §10, at 6, col. 2, 7, col. 1.

204. Evening Outlook, Nov. 3, 1976, at 1, col. 2. 20,199 votes were cast in favor of the
measure; 17,067 votes, against. Evening Outlook, Nov. 5, 1976, at 13, col. 5.
205. L.A. Times (West Side), Nov. 4, 1976), §7, at 1, col. 6.
206. Evening Outlook, Nov. 5, 1976, at 1, col. 3. One additional problem beginning to loom
on the horizon is Santa Monica's proposed redevelopment of a 67-acre site adjacent to the
municipal airport. It is planned that this 67-acre site plus 64 acres of adjoining city land at the
airport be redeveloped for combined residential/commercial/recreational land uses. Criticism
has already surfaced that such a commercial center would be detrimental to existing Santa
Monica businesses and to the proposed downtown shopping center. L.A. Times (West Side),
Jan. 6, 1977, §7, at 1, col. 2-5 (emphasis added).
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which would only benefit the redevelopment agencies in repeating the
process.
The business community's interest in replacing low-cost housing with
higher-intensity housing and commercial uses is obvious, as is the city's
interest in raising property values and thereby deriving higher tax revenues.
But, as pointed out earlier, the increased revenues, if any, go back to the
redevelopment agencies; they do not benefit the city.
Moreover, it is unlikely that either the San Francisco convention center
complex or the Santa Monica enclosed shopping mall will ever be the
financial success their proponents proclaim. In San Francisco, two existing
convention facilities are already operating at a $200,000 annual deficit.2 7
The addition of yet another convention center means that business which
cannot now support two such facilities will be stretched even thinner to
cover three, thus forcing all three to operate at a deficit. The sports arena
planned for YBC will have similar competition, and San Francisco is
currently losing rental fees on Candlestick Park where tax revenues were
specifically earmarked to pay off bonds issued for that stadium's renovation. 20 8 Shortfalls in the projected use of the convention center and sports
arena will cause under-use of the parking garage as well, thus eliminating at
least part of the anticipated revenues from that source.
In Santa Monica, any new stores face competition not only from the
existing three-block mall, but from retail establishments on adjacent streets
as well. If shoppers do flock to the new mall, surrounding stores will lose
business in direct proportion to the amount of business done by the new
shopping area. Should this happen, Santa Monica may actually lose tax
revenues, because while revenues from existing stores which the city now
collects will drop, revenues from the new stores in the project area will go to
the redevelopment agency.
Moreover, Santa Monica stores do not compete in a vacuum. The City of
Santa Monica lies at the coastal edge of the Los Angeles basin in an urban
region richly served by department stores, shopping centers, and a vast array
of small businesses. No less than 15 major department stores are within 20
minutes' driving time of the proposed new shopping center; six of these are
less than 15 minutes' drive by automobile, and three are immediately
adjacent.20 9 For the proponents of the Santa Monica center to fix on merely
the newest rival (Fox Hills Mall) as luring away Santa Monica shoppers (a
thesis not demonstrated by any available data) is to ignore most of the real
competition.
207. HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 165-67.
208. Id.
209. GUIDELINES, supra note 138. Of course, in Southern California, most residents do
everything by car. Aside from the fact that Santa Monica is ringed with a multitude of
department stores, it should be noted that four large regional shopping centers also lie within a

twenty minute drive of the Santa Monica site-Fox Hills Mall, Century Square, Westland
Shopping Center, and Ward Plaza.
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A further misconception in using the redevelopment process to enhance
the city's tax base hinges on the way in which shopping center properties are
valued. Since such commercial enterprises generate a stream of rental
income, their fair market value is determined by capitalizing the income
generated. 210 Therefore, in order for the value of the property to increase,
the level of sales activity must also increase. This increases the rental value,
which usually is tied to the volume of sales, and hence, the value of the
property for tax purposes rises. But, as the total number of consumers in a
given locale is finite-and so too is their spendable income-the increase in
the number of shopping centers obviously does not generate a corresponding
increase in the total amount of merchandise sold. Therefore, as more and
more shopping centers compete for the consumer's dollar, each center's
chances of being a financial success not only lessen, but the addition of new
shopping centers hastens the early demise of older, still viable retail centers
in the area. 21 1 It is just such overdevelopment which has forced shopping
centers that are only about 20 years old-well within the amortization period
212 to spend millions of dollars on "revitalization"
of redevelopment bonds
2 13
to meet competition.
Many cities have bet the taxpayers' money on the redevelopment game;
quite a few have lost. The Real Estate Research Corporation analyzed more
than 70 renewal projects and found approximately one-third of them were
experiencing major problems or delays. 214
Examination of the causes of the problems and delays suggests that
redevelopment agencies have ignored hard facts which unsubsidized
businessmen could not afford to disregard. Over 90 percent of the projects
surveyed encountered delay because of "lack of marketability for commercial uses" of land, "declining population buying power for market support," "inappropriate timing of marketing effort" for land, and "inadequate developer selection process." 21 5 Over two-thirds of the projects surveyed encountered delay due to "lack of soundness in original plan,"
"inappropriate initial project scale," "lack of aggressiveness in LPA
[i.e., redevelopment agency] marketing program," "inability of developer
to perform," and "inflexibility in terminating a developer's contract.' '216
210.
211.
col. I.

See Clayton v. County of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. App. 3d 390, 102 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1972).
See Lembke, SuburbanMalls Start to Show Age, L.A. Times, July 31, 1976, §1, at i,

212. For example, $21,350,000 of lease-revenue bonds were offered for sale in August 1976

by the Pasadena (California) Redevelopment Agency. Twenty-two years will elapse before
these bonds are 50 percent amortized; they will not be fully amortized until September 2005.
L.A. Times, Aug. 29, 1976, §8, at 3, col. 3.
213. Stanford (California) Shopping Center, 21 years old, is spending $17 million to rebuild
in 1976; $7 million was spent "revitalizing" La Mirada (California) Mall before it was even 18
years old; Lakewood (California) Shopping Center, 26 years old, will spend $8 million for

"rejuvenation" in 1977. Ray Wilson of Coldwell Banker & Co., leasing agents for 65 regional
shopping centers across the country, predicts that modernizing of 20-year-old suburban centers
will reach "major proportions" in 1977 and 1978. See note 211 supra.
214. FUTURE, supra note 138, at 4.
215. GUIDELINES. supra note 138, at 22.
216. Id.
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These statistics argue persuasively that redevelopment agencies have taken
on functions which they are not equipped to perform-functions best left to
the workings of the marketplace and to unsubsidized businessmen. The
project surveyors found that Over two-thirds of the projects they studied had
"inexperienced LPA staff" and "ineffective LPA leadership. "217
The question ultimately comes down to whether there is any need for
taxpayer-subsidized redevelopment of non-slum areas into nonresidential
areas. Examples abound of innovative central business district modernization undertaken without the use of the redevelopment process and taxpayer
subsidies. 2 18 Contrary to claims that the eminent domain power is required
in order to assemble sufficient land to redevelop an area, 219 case studies
demonstrate that private business interests will willingly pay the entire cost
of redevelopment if they see a profit. 220 Correspondingly, of course, where
a local government is willing to assemble the land through use of the
eminent domain power, to build parking structures through use of leaserevenue bonds backed up by tax increment financing, to pay the administrative and architectural costs of putting the package together, and to assume a
large share of the long-term risk, the reasonable businessman may well
conclude that he can risk opening a department store in a questionable
location. If he were forced to gamble with his own money, the same
businessman would not think twice about rejecting the site.
In spite of studies such as those cited in this article, proponents of urban
renewal continue to tout it as a method of increasing the tax base of the city.
To sell the program, local governments and redevelopment agencies consistently promise that an increase in valuation of the land will be accomplished
without the use of tax dollars-a patently false claim-and that the increase
of value of land within the redevelopment project will somehow better the
quality of life for all residents of the area. But, as amply demonstrated, any
increase in assessed value of the project area generates increased revenues
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., case studies of projects in Atlanta, Ga.; Oshkosh, Wisc.; Minneapolis,
Minn.; New York City, N.Y.; Kansas City, Mo.; Pittsfield, Mass.; Houston, Texas; Los

Angeles, Cal.; Louisville, Ky.; Chicago, Ill.; Buffalo, N.Y.; Lansing, Mich. and Bridgeport,
Conn. in REDSTONE, supra note 138.

219. A private developer in Houston, Texas negotiated with 300 homeowners in order to
acquire a desired site. REDSTONE, supra note 138, at 142. In Buffalo, New York, another private
developer purchased 560,000 square feet from 60 different landlords. Id. at 233.

220. Franklin Town, a 50-acre, privately financed development of some 22 blocks, is
sponsored by five corporations- four owned one-half the land, and the fifth is an equity
investor who provided the initial financing. Although eminent domain was used to obtain some

of the land for this project in Philadelphia, no writedown was taken, and the corporations paid
for all municipal costs. Furthermore, the corporations agreed to include a housing mix to serve
persons of all income levels and committed themselves to cash payments, rental subsidies, and
replacement housing construction arrangements equal or better than benefits required under the
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. REDSTONE,
supra note 138, at 168. See also the case study of the Baystate West project in Springfield,

Massachusetts, constructed under state legislation which allows a developer to use eminent
domain to acquire property and also permits the negotiation of tax contracts with the city for 40
years, but limits the developer to a maximum of six percent return on the dollar. REDSTONE,
supra note 138, at 98-100.
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only to the redevelopment agency and is spent for bond debts and starting up
22
additional redevelopment projects elsewhere in the city. '
To summarize, the use of the redevelopment process to subsidize shopping centers, convention facilities, and high-rise luxury apartment buildings
is wasteful of the taxpayers' money. Such tax-subsidized redevelopment
consistently fails to pass strict economic cost-benefit analysis--even when
the "hidden" costs are ignored. Aside from questionable esthetic benefits,
no social benefits result from the taking of non-slum property for nonresidential redevelopment. Tax increment funding of redevelopment projects has led to massive tax diversions at the expense of schools, police
forces, fire fighting districts, and other tax-funded municipal services.
Clearly, the redevelopment process is not necessary to develop non-slum
land. In terms of the benefits received, then, the urban renewal program is
not practical. In terms of the often needless-and always undercompensated-human suffering caused, the program is not moral. It is, however,
legal, having been tested in the courts on many occasions and generally
upheld.
The fundamental principle upon which urban renewal is based was first
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 1954 in the landmark case
of Berman v. Parker,22 2 but in order to fully understand the significance of
that case, it is necessary to first retreat to the late nineteenth century.
URBAN RENEWAL AND THE COURTS

A.

The Public Use Doctrine

In the late nineteenth century, the law paid much lip service to private
property rights, suggesting that it would not authorize a violation of that
property, even for the general good of the whole community. 223 No case
prior to 1936 authorized the taking of private property in order to clear slums
or build new houses for private residential or commercial use. The breakthrough came in New York City Housing Authority v. Muller 224 which
validated the use of the eminent domain power to take land in order to clear,
replan, and reconstruct slum areas and provide housing accommodations for
the poor. That case held that the public welfare, not solely use by the public,
2 5
would justify the use of the eminent domain power. 2
221. Or for building fire stations and city halls. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
222. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
223. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 26 (Ewell Ed. 1889). In fact, taking to benefit private
interests was, however, permitted. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527
(1906); See Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885). See also Scheiber, PropertyLaw,
Expropriation and Resource Allocation by Government: the United States, 1789-1910, 33 J.
ECON. HisT. 232 (1973).
224. 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936).
225. According to the court:
The fundamental purpose of government is to protect the health, safety, and general
welfare of the public. All its complicated activities have that simple end in view. Its
power plant for the purpose consists of the power of taxation, the police power, and
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Ten years later, the United States Supreme Court, in upholding the
Tennessee Valley Authority's condemnation for the Fontana Dam project,
stated that:
it is the function of Congress to decide what type of taking is for a
public use and. . . the agency authorized to do the taking may do
226
so to the full extent of its statutory authority.
By making the determination of public benefit a purely legislative question
and putting it beyond judicial review, the court paved the way for its
decision in Berman.
In Berman v. Parker,227 the owners challenged the taking of their department store under the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945.228 In
that act-without defining either "slums" or "blighted areas"-Congress
made a finding that the conditions in the District of Columbia were injurious
to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare. Congress then declared
that acquisition of property was necessary to eliminate the substandard
housing and blighted areas and that private enterprise alone was unable to
satisfactorily redevelop the area. Finally, Congress stated that "the acquisition and the assembly of real property and the leasing or sale thereof for
redevelopment pursuant to a project area redevelopment plan. . . is hereby
229
declared to be a public use."
The owners, however, contended that their department store, although
located in a blighted area, was not slum housing. Furthermore, they argued,
no public purpose was served by the condemnation since the cleared land
was to be turned over to private owners to redevelop for private, not public,
230
use, thereby violating the public use limitation of the fifth amendment.
The challenge failed.
The Court held that the legislature may plan on a broad basis and clear all
the land in a project area to carry out a redevelopment project. Nonobjectionablebuildings within the area may also be removed, the rights of
their owners being satisfied when the owners receive the just compensation
which the fifth amendment exacts as the price of the taking. Once the public
purpose has been established, Congress alone determines how the project is
the power of eminent domain. Whenever there arises, in the state, a condition of
affairs holding a substantial menace to the public health, safety, general welfare, it
becomes the duty of the government to apply whatever power is necessary and
appropriate to check it. There are differences in the nature and characteristics of the
powers, though distinction between them is often fine . . . .But if the menace is
serious enough to the public to warrant public action and the power applied is
reasonably and fairly calculated to check it, and bears a reasonable relation to the

evil, it seems to be constitutionally immaterial whether one or another of the

sovereign powers is employed.
270 N.Y. 333, 340-41, 1 N.E.2d 153, 155 (1936).
226. United States ex rel TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1946).
227. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
228. D.C. Code §§5-701 - 5-719, 60 Stat. 790 (1951).
229. Id. §2.
230. U. S. CONST. amend. V: "...
nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." (emphasis added)
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to be executed, and it is within Congress' power to allow private enterprise
to redevelop the condemned area. In the words of the Court,
It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. . . . If
those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is
231
nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Justice Douglas' stirring prose aside, it must be pointed out that the redevelopment plan under which these owners' land was seized made detailed
provisions for the types of dwelling units to be built in the project area. At
lease one-third of them were to be low-rent housing with a maximum rental
of $17 per room per month. 232 That is not, however, what was built.
Instead, the redevelopers constructed a shopping mall and a complex of
high-rent apartments and townhouses. 233 No low-cost housing was built in
the project area. Prior to the redevelopment, some 5,012 persons resided
234
within the boundaries of the project; 97.5 percent of them were black.
But the problems raised by Berman go far beyond the failure to provide
housing for the displaced population. The Court apparently-and perhaps
naively-assumed that the redevelopment plan would be followed. This
may account for the lack of discussion of relocation, a subject the Court
never mentions. Nor does the Court indicate any awareness of the National
Housing Act of 1949,235 under which slum dwellers were supposed to be the
beneficiaries of "a decent home and a suitable living environment" 236 rather
than the victims of high-cost residential and commercial uses of the land.
More importantly though, in terms of the orderly development of constitutional law doctrines, the Court not only thoroughly confused the eminent domain power with the police power, 237 but it failed to spell out the
precise limits of this new police power with compensation in the urban
renewal context. Yet this was the same Court which 18 years earlier had let
stand a court of appeals decision which refused to allow the federal government to engage in slum clearance on the theory that the government would
then be free to condemn any private property that could be employed to
238
public advantage.
231. 348 U.S. at 33.
232. Id. at 30-31.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See also note 34 supra.
348 U.S. 26, 30.
42 U.S.C. §1441 et seq. (1970).
42 U.S.C. §1441(a) (1970).

237. The Court thereby confounded judicial and scholarly theorists "who [had) been
proceeding on the oft articulated notion that 'eminent domain power' and 'police power'are
quite different, and it is that difference that justifies payment of just compensation in one but
not the other." Kanner, Taking or Damagingby Regulation. ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY ON
EMINENT DOMAIN (Oct. 1975).
238. In the earlier case, the Sixth Circuit commented that:

1977 / Urban Renewal
The police power refers to the inherent right of the government to regulate
the property and activities of its citizens to protect the health, morals, safety,
and welfare of the community. 2 39 It is distinguished by the lack of compensation to the owner whose property was destroyed or regulated out of
existence in the public interest. Of all governmental powers, the police
power is the most far-reaching and the least susceptible to limitation,
although it is subject to constitutional requirements.
The eminent domain power, on the other hand, contains two limitations:
"just compensation" must be paid, and the property may only be taken if it
is to serve a "public use." The issue presented in Berman is whether the
police power, supported by "just compensation" drawn from eminent
domain, can be used for purely aesthetic considerations. 240 In replying in the
affirmative, the Court merged the police power and the eminent domain
power into a single legal entity, but failed to elaborate as to the extent to
1
which this new combined power may be used.24
One commentator was especially disturbed by this "sneaky" use of the
eminent domain power in Berman because the Court admitted that the
The tearing down of the old buildings and the construction of new ones on the land
sought to be taken would create, it is true, a new resource for employment of labor
and capital. It is likewise true that the erection of the sanitary dwellings upon the
property and the leasing or the selling of them at low prices would enable many
residents of the community to improve their living conditions. It may be, too, that
these group benefits, so far as they might affect the general public, would be
beneficial. If, however, such a result thus attained is to be considered a public use for
which the government may condemn private property, there would seem to be no
reason why it could not condemn any private property which it could employ to an
advantage to the public ....
United States v. Certain Lands in City of Louisiana, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935), appeal
dismissed, 297 U.S. 726 (1936).
239. The traditional notion of the police power was restricted to matters of necessity, such
as the destruction of a building to halt a conflagration, Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69, 59 Am. Dec.
385 (1853), or of supplies to prevent their capture by enemy forces, United States v. Caltex,
Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952). It was also used to restrict or regulate private property to protect the
public health, welfare, safety, or morals. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Consolidated Rock Products Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962).
240. Professor Gormley believes that the undeclared foundation for Berman is United
States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896), wherein the Court approved the
federal government's acquisition of the Gettysburg battlefield areas, reasoning that such
national monuments created aesthetic values which benefited the entire country. Gormley,
Urban Redevelopment to FurtherAesthetic Considerations:The Changing ConstitutionalConcepts of Police PowerandEminent Domain,41 N.D.L. Rev. 316,322 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Gormley]. Pre-Berman law did sanction the use of the police power to regulate the height of
buildings if the aesthetic purpose was, at least theoretically, subordinate to safety, health, or
welfare. See, e.g., Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N.E. 745 (1907), affirmed 214 U.S. 91
(1909). Billboards, also, were subject to regulation under the rationale that they were a menace
to public health, welfare, safety, and morals, when really the regulating ordinances were mostly
aesthetic controls. Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); St. Louis Gunning Adv.
Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911). The billboard regulations continue to
be challenged, and the courts continue to uphold them. For a recent sampling, see People ex rel.
Dep't Pub. Works v. Golden Rule Church Ass'n, 49 Cal. App. 3d 773, 122, Cal. Rptr. 596
(1975); Inhabitants Town of Boothbay v. National Adv. Co., 347 A.2d 419 (Me. 1975); Rochester Poster Adv. v. Town of Brighton, 49 App. Div. 2d 273, 374 N.Y.S. 2d 510 (1975).
241. One way in which urban renewal has used this hybrid power is in the enforcement of
regulations (e.g., housing codes, building codes, and sanitary codes) to rehabilitate and conserve structures not condemned in a redevelopment area. It is unclear, however, if policepower-with-compensation can be used for punitive purposes, such as the condemnation of
illegally used property.
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property was taken not for slum clearance, but to develop a more attractive
community:
The implication of this holding is that it will now be possible to
coerce property owners in a variety of situations because of the
inherent threat that their property will be seized if they do not
242
conform to administrative determinations.
Initially, in order to have a "public use," it was necessary to erect
low-cost housing in addition to removing slum areas. But Berman's combination of police power and eminent domain power theories to promote urban
aesthetics substantially limited the effect of the public use doctrine as a
limitation on governmental condemnations. By using the police power as a
rationale for the exercise of eminent domain to beautify the community, the
Court set up an expectation that courts will generally justify action taken by
redevelopment agencies any time a new need arises for which the agency
can use privately owned land. It now suffices if there is some conjectural
public benefit flowing from the taking (as distinguished from the subsequent
244
243
use of the land), and neither the necessity nor the extent of the taking
245
are judicial questions.
Berman is also noteworthy in that it totally lacks references to prior
judicial pronouncements concerning the use of the police power to enforce
esthetic notions. 246 More importantly, Berman fails to come to grips with
the societal value of protecting private property rights. A stable society
requires that not'only other individuals, but the government as well, respect
and protect the rights of property owners. 247 But instead of considering the
claims of the aggrieved owners, the Court threw up its hands in fear of the
possible-and totally conjectural-consequences should the owners be
heard.
Property may of course be taken for this redevelopment which,
standing by itself, is innocuous andz unoffending. . . . If owner
after owner were permitted to resist these redevelopment programs on the ground that his particular property was not being
used against the public interest, integrated plans for redevelop248
ment would suffer greatly.
Such judicial handwringing is unjustifiable. The aggrieved owner is told
that, yes, his property might be perfectly "standard," but, no, he may not
242. Gormley, supra note 240, at 330. Professor Gormley's concern that Berman would
allow public entities to require owners to modify admittedly safe structures to conform with
various master plans was well founded. See Housing & Redev. Auth. of Minnneapolis v.
Froney, 234 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. 1975).
243. 348 U.S. at 33.

244. Id. at 35-36.
245. But query: how does one determine that a taking is indeed for a public purpose
without reference to the subsequent use of the property?
246. But see note 240 supra for one possible foundation for Berman's expansive language.

247. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
248. 348 U.S. at 35.
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be heard to complain of its loss in a court of justice.24 9 The conclusion is that
the individual citizen, the small landowner who lacks political influence,
has considerably less protection under the fifth and fourteenth amendments
25 0
to the United States Constitution as a result of the Berman decision.
Finally, Berman is defective in that it fails to deal with the elements of
that "just compensation" which the owners are told is the only thing they
are entitled to when their property is taken to provide a beautiful, healthy,
spacious, clean, well-balanced, and carefully patrolled community for the
benefit of those who can afford to live in it after it is redeveloped. Fortunately, other courts have been less shy at telling us just what is-or more
accurately, what is not-covered by "just compensation."
B.

"Just Compensation"--Neither Just Nor Compensation

Eminent domain is defined as the power of the sovereign to take private
property for public use without the consent of the property owner. 2 51 The
obligation to compensate the owner is a condition imposed upon the exercise
of that power.252 The constitutional prohibition against uncompensated
takings is grounded in concepts of basic justice2 53 and derives as much
content from the basic equitable principle of fairness as it does from
technical concepts of property law. 254 The owner's right is considered a
basic civil right, 255 and he is to be put in the same position pecuniarily that
he would have occupied had his property not been taken.25 6 Furthermore,
57
private property owners are not required to subsidize public projects.
Nevertheless, owners who attempt to seek redress from the courts when
their property is destroyed by "progress" are met with judicial hostility and
admonished that "just compensation" does not equal total indemnification. 258 What types of losses, then, are owners forced to bear without
249.

If any reader has forgotten Mr. Morris' sad tale, see text accompanying notes 47-57

supra.
250. Gormley, supra note 240, at 331.
251. 3 NICHOLS. supra note 17, at §1.11.. For an account of one of the first recorded
condemnations in history, see the story of Naboth the Jezreelite. 1 Kings 21.
252. 3 NICHOLS. supra note 17, at §8.1[11].
253. United States v. Virginia Elec. Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 631 (1961); United States v.
Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 (1959).
254. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973); Almota Farmers Elev. & Whse. Co.

v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 478 (1973).
255. In connection with this right, the Supreme Court has said that:
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without
unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a
personal" right, whether the "property" in question be a welfare check, a home, or

a savings account. In fact a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning
without the other. That rights in property are basic civil rights has long been

recognized.

Lynch v. Household Fin. Co., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
256. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
257. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960); Albers v. County of Los Angeles,
62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965); Furrer v. Talent Irr. Dist., 258 Ore. 494,
466 P.2d 605 (1970).
258. Community Redev. Agency of Los Angeles v. Abrams, 15 Cal. 3d 813, 827, 543 P.2d
905, 915, 126 Cal. Rptr. 473, 483 (1975).
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compensation when their property is taken for an urban redevelopment
project?
The phrase "just compensation" means the value of the land taken and
the damage, if any, to land not taken, 259 as measured by the owner's loss
(rather than by the condemnor's gain).260 The determination of the amount
of compensation to be paid to the owner is a judicial question, 261 arrived at
by computing the "fair market value" 262 of the real estate. Courts have been
known to insist on using "fair market value" as determined by comparison
of comparable properties even when the condemned property is unique and
no comparable property exists.263
Since the "fair market value" is determined as of the moment the
property is "taken," the owner may face the problem that his property has
depreciated during the period the public project was pending. As happened
in Yerba Buena and in Boston's West End, once notice that a taking is
imminent becomes widespread, tenants depart, and owners are reluctant to
expend funds on upkeep of property they will lose in the foreseeable future.
The area depreciates rapidly; such sales of real property which do occur are
at depressed prices. These owners receive no compensation from the governmental entity planning the project-either to compensate them for the
difference between the depressed price and the pre-blight price or to help
them relocate.
Other owners who stick it out until the formal condemnation occurs may
face a period of several years' time during which rental income dwindles
and vanishes entirely. Unless the owner is able to attract new tenants-who
ordinarily pay much lower rentals because of the deteriorating condition of
the neighborhood and lack of expectation of long-term occupancy-or can
afford to pay taxes and insurance premiums on property which no longer
produces measurable income, he risks losing the property altogether due to
foreclosure. 264 While most courts now compensate the hold-outs for the
259. 3 NICHOLS, supra note 17, at §8.6.
260. 3 NICHOLS, supra note 17, at §8.61; General Motors Corp. v. United States, 323 U.S.
373 (1945); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
261. United States v. New River Collieries, 262 U.S. 341, 343-44 (1923); Seaboard Air Line

Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923); Monongahela Navig. Co. v. United States, 148
U.S. 312, 327 (1892).
262. "Fair market value" refers to the price which a willing buyer and a willing seller
would agree upon for th&property on a free and open market. The Constitution does not require
the use of fair market value, and occasionally courts have opted for other methods of valuating

property. See, e.g., United States v. Cors 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949) (fair market value not a
judicial "fetish"); Housing Auth. of Savannah v. Savannah Iron & Wire Works, 91 Ga. App.
881, 87 S.E.2d 671 (1955) (fair and reasonable value of property to owner). Another court

characterized the search for "fair market value" as a "snipe hunt carried on at midnight on a
moonless landscape." Fusegni v. Portsmouth Hous. Auth., 114 N.H. 207, 211, 317 A.2d 580,
583 (1974).
263. See Gray v. Providence Redev. Auth., 114 R.I. 370, 333 A.2d 143 (1975), where the

Rhode Island High court upheld the valuation of a 222-year-old pre-Revolutionary building
based on "comparables"- sales in 1960, 1963, and 1966 of properties which were over 100
years old, but neither as old nor as historically significant as the subject property.
264. See, e.g., Sayre v. United States, 282 F. Supp. 175, 178-79 (N.D. Ohio 1967);
Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).

1977 / Urban Renewal
decrease in property value caused by condemnation blight, 265 many owners
lack the economic resources to hang on for several years. 266 Nor is an action
in inverse condemnation necessarily the answer. The aggrieved owner, who
has already suffered project-caused diminution in value of his real estate and
out-of-pocket expenses to pay his attorney and court costs, may be unable to
prove the requisite elements of a "taking" in his jurisdiction.267
Aside from blight-induced losses, the owner suffers incidental 268 losses as
a result of the forced relocation. The most visible loss is, of course, the cost
of the actual move, 269 but there are a multitude of additional, hidden costs:
Where the move is of a substantial distance or where the replacement housing is not ready for occupancy when the move must be
made, the displaced resident may incur costs for transportation,
lodging, and meals for his family in addition to the costs of moving
his personal property (which costs may include wear and tear).
However, even before the displaced resident can even think about
moving costs, he must find a place to move. This may entail time
265. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 405 F.2d
138 (6th Cir. 1968); Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1(1972); In re Elmwood Park Project Section 1, Group B, 376 Mich. 311, 136 N.W.2d 896 (1965);
City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241,269 N.E.2d 895, 32J N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971);
City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52 (1963); Luber v. Milwaukee
County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 177 N.W.2d 380 (1970).
266. Delays of a decade or more are not unheard of. See Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F.
Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (14 years); Silva v. City & County of San Francisco, 87 Cal. App.
2d 784, 198 P.2d 78 (1948) (13 years); In re Elmwood Park Project Section 1, Group B, 376
Mich. 311, 136 N.W.2d 896 (1965) (12 years); A. Gettelman Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee,
245 Wis. 9, 13 N.W.2d 541 (1944) (31 years).
267. In New York, for example, the owner must prove a de facto taking-i.e., physical
entry by the condemnor, a physical outster of the owner, a legal interference with the physical
use, possession or enjoyment of the property, or a legal interference with the owner's power of
disposition. City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241,269 N.E.2d 895, 321 N.Y.S.2d
345 (1971). Given the modern Hohfeldian view of property, such judicial insistence on the
physical attributes of property is quaint, to say the least. For further discussion of this problem,
see Kanner, CondemnationBlight: Just How Just is JustCompensation?48 NOTRE DAME LAW.
765 (1973).
268. Although courts often refer to "incidental losses" as "consequential losses," the
latter term more appropriately applies to losses which occur to the owner's remaining property
in a partial taking (i.e., severance damages). The authors prefer to use the term "incidental
damages" to refer to nonphysical property losses to the condemnee whose entire fee is taken.
See Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67
YALE L. J. 61 (1957) for a brilliant analysis of the inadequacy of American rules of compensability. See also Millspaugh, Problemsand Opportunitiesof Relocation, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
6 (1961); Note, The Interest in Rootedness: Family Relocation and an Approach to Full
Indemnity, 21 STAN. L. REV. 801 (1969); Klein, JudicialResponseto the HumanDisruption, 46
J. URB. L. 1 (1968).
269. This is generally held to be a non-compensable loss in an eminent domain proceeding.
Los Gatos v. Sund, 234 Cal. App. 2d 24, 44 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1965). The displaced business which
makes an agreement with the redevelopment agency relating to the processing of expenses of
disconnection, removal, and reinstallation of machinery and fixtures may learn to its dismay
that the agreement is not worth the paper on which it is written. King Athletic Goods Co. v.
Redevelopment Auth., 475 Pa. 17, 323 A.2d 727 (1974). Such losses have occasionally been
compensated in temporary takings, however. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. I
(1949); United States v. General Motors Corp. 323 U.S. 373 (1945). In Kimball, the court held:
The temporary interruption as opposed to the final severance of occupancy so greatly
narrows the range of alternatives open to the condemnee that it substantially increases the condemnor's obligation to him. It is a difference in degree wide enough to
require a difference in result.
338 U.S. at 15. Relocation statutes have recently been enacted to help solve this problem. See
notes 306-314 infra and accompanying text.
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lost from work or real estate finders' fees. Then the displaced
resident incurs certain costs in obtaining substitute housing; these
may include, when housing is purchased, costs of appraisal, survey, title examination, and closing costs. When housing is rented
the costs may include security deposits for utility service and
advance payments of rent. In addition, he may incur substantial
costs in the form of increased charges to finance the replacement
housing. 270
The displaced person may have difficulty finding replacement housing of
comparable quality for a price similar to what he was paying for the
condemned property, because urban renewal frequently destroys or significantly reduces the total supply of low-cost housing in an area. 27 1 The
displaced resident is therefore competing for a smaller supply of low-cost
dwelling units whose landlords have probably taken advantage of the situation and raised rents accordingly.
Furthermore, the displaced resident may lose his job if his place of
employment was located within the project area since the building may have
been torn down. If the job is located outside of the project area or can
relocate outside of the project area, the resident may still have problems. He
may be unable to reach the job from his new residence or, if he can still
reach his place of employment, he may face increased commuting costs
which reduce his disposable income.
Noneconomic losses also result from urban renewal condemnations. As
detailed in the study of Boston's West End population, 272 the displaced
residents suffer from the disruption of relationships built up in their former
homes. The grief caused by this forced removal from their homes and the
breakdown of the network of existing social structures can last for long
periods of time. It is totally uncompensated in an eminent domain
proceeding.
Small businesses suffer additional uncompensated losses when the bulldozer rolls through an area. Redevelopment projects are particularly devastating to the small businessman because they take not only the land on which
the business is located, but the neighborhood in which the business' clientele live. As a result, small businessmen are forced to "shoulder a vastly
disproportionate share of the cost of public improvements, and . . . are
273
often literally pauperized in the process."
One source of particular hardship is the failure of courts to compensate
270. 3 NICHOLS, supra note 17, at §8.10(3).
271. See text accompanying notes 96-98 supra.
272. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
273. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS, 88m CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY OF COMPENSAtion
AND ASSISTANCE FOR PERSONS AFFECTED BY REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION IN FEDERAL AND

FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS. 107-08 (Comm. Print No. 31, Dec. 22, 1964).
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displaced businessmen for loss of goodwill when the fee is condemned.2 74
Under one theory, damage to the business is considered non-compensable
because only the land was taken-not the business or its goodwill.27 5 A
second theory is that damages to business or goodwill is damnum absque
injuria.2 76 This second theory allows a trial court to hold that an owner's
business goodwill was "taken, damaged and destroyed," 'but yet deny the
277
owner any compensation for this lost commodity.
A third rationale for denial of business goodwill damages is that because
business is less tangible in nature and more uncertain in its vicissitudes than
the rights which are constitutionally protected, the courts lack the ability to
value it. 278 This is not only nonsensical; it is unconscionable. Judicial
incantations notwithstanding, courts routinely value goodwill and other
business losses in private litigation. 279 Furthermore, goodwill is routinely
274. This general rule has been roundly criticized by the commentators. See Aloi &
Goldberg, A Reexamination of Value, Goodwill and Business Losses in Eminent Domain, 53
CORNELL L. REV. 604 (1968); Kanner, When is "Property" Not "Property Itself"? A Critical
Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensationfor Loss of Goodwill in Eminent Domain,
6 CAL. W.L. REV. 57 (1969); Note, "Just Compensation"for the Small Businessman, 2 COLUM.
J. OF L. & SOC. PROB. 144 (1966); Note, The Unsoundness of California'sNon-Compensability
Rule as Applied to Business Losses in Condemnation Cases, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 675 (1969);
Comment, Non-Compensable Business Losses in Eminent Domain Proceedings:A Time for
Re-evaluation, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 72 (1972).
275. Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925). Of course, this flies in the face of the
rule that the property is valued by what the owner has lost, rather than by what the condemnor
has gained. See State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 824 (Alaska 1976).
276. City of Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153 P. 705 (1915).
This ossified bit of latinized double talk means no more than that the loss is inflicted on the
victim without a legal wrong. Thus, while this notion may make sense in tort law, it becomes
positively irrational in eminent domain because there is never anything wrongful (in a tort
sense) in expropriation of private property.
277. Community Redev. Agency of Los Angeles v. Abrams, 116 Cal. Rptr. 308 (Cal. App.
1974), vacated, 15 Cal. 3d 813, 543 P.2d 905, 126 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1975). The Court of Appeal, in
a divided opinion, held that the owner's business goodwill was compensable property. This
opinion was vacated, however, when the California Supreme Court granted hearing. The
Supreme Court then affirmed the trial court's judgment denying compensation to the owner, a
64-year-old, arthritic gentleman who had operated a drugstore in the same location for 28 years
before an urban renewal project razed his building and scattered his clientele to the four winds.
278. 2 NiCHOLS, supra note 17, at §5.76; Sawyer v. Commonwealth, 182 Mass. 245, 65
N.E. 52, 59 L.R.A. 726 (1902). "The right to business damages is a matter of legislative grace,
not constitutional imperative. Lost profits and business damages are intangibles which generally do not constitute 'property' in the constitutional sense." Jamesson v. Downtown Dev. Auth.
322 So. 2d 510, 511 (Fla. 1975). Accord, as to the dichotomy of property vs. property in a
constitutional sense, is Community Redev. Agency of Los Angeles v. Abrams, 15 Cal. 3d 813,
543 P.2d 905, 126 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1975).
In Florida, business losses are compensated in partial takings, but not in whole take cases. In
an interesting exhibition of circular reasoning, however, aggrieved condemnees (tenants) were
denied the right to attack this disparity because, said the court, a finding of constitutional
infirmity in the statute would only deny benefits to condemnees in partial takings, but would not
benefit these litigants. 322 So.2d at 511. When the Florida courts do get a partial take case,
compensation for business losses may still be denied. Witness Hodges v. Division of Admin.,
State, Dep't of Transp., 323 So.2d 275 (Fla. App. 1975) wherein the state condemned part of a
parcel improved with a motel and marina complex. The Hodges bought the property in 1971
after the IRS placed a lien against the property for nonpayment of taxes; they did not purchase
the accounts receivable nor assume any liabilities. The court held that they purchased only the
real property and not a going concern; and compensation for business damages was not
required.
279. It bears noting that the United States Supreme Court experienced no unusual difficulties in such valuations in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1949)-and
Kimball is a condemnation case. Likewise, in an inverse condemnation case, the California
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defined as "property ' 280 and is treated as such for tax purposes. If the
government experiences no insurmountable problems in valuing goodwill in
tax litigation, there is no defensible reason why, when the same government
enters the same courtroom in the guise of a condemnor, it and the court
somehow abruptly lose their ability to value goodwill.
Because it is not unusual for a condemned business to be unable to
relocate because of zoning, ecological, and price restrictions, 28 1 some courts
have recognized that the rule of noncompensability of goodwill often works
great hardship. Judicial solutions to this problem, however, vary. Some
courts suggest that the legislature should make statutory provision for such
losses.23 2 Others allow compensation for business dislocation under relocation assistance acts. 283 Still others hold that because the owner failed to
relocate, he does not fit within the statutory definition of a "displaced
person" for purposes of relocation assistance and, hence, is not entitled to
any benefits.2 84 Some courts take an indirect approach to compensation of
displaced businesses. The Connecticut Supreme Court, for example, held
that although damages for loss of a business conducted on condemned
property are not compensable, the fact that the business is in operation on
the realty and has a profitable history should be considered in determining
the market value of the realty since the use of the land for the purpose of the
business enhances the value of the realty. 285 Finally, a few courts do face the
problem squarely and allow compensation for losses where an owner cannot
relocate. 6
In view of the hostility of the courts to claims for business losses from
displaced businesses, it should come as no surprise that where the public
project displaces all or part of the clientele of an adjacent commercial
center, and some of the shopping center tenants therefore breach their
leases, all of which causes the owners of the shopping center to suffer loss of
Supreme Court awarded damages on the basis of past profits. See Natural Soda Prod. Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 2d 193, 199-201, 143 P.2d 12, 17 (1974).
230. CAL. CIv. CODE §§654, 655; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §14102.

281.

State v. Davis Concrete of Delaware, Inc., 355 A.2d 883 (Del. 1976); City of Lansing

v.Wery, 68 Mich. Ct. App. 158, 242 N.W.2d 51 (1976); Redevelopment Auth. of Philadelphia

Urb. Renewal Area v. Premises, 357 A.2d 246 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976); March v. Redevelop-

ment Auth., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 212, 342 A.2d 131 (1975).
282. State v. Davis Concrete of Delaware, Inc., 355 A.2d 883 (Del. 1976). In California, the

legislature did make such provision in its new Eminent Domain Law, CAL. CODE Civ. PROC.
§ 1263.510. In a case decided on the eve of the new law, however, the California Supreme Court
declined to follow the legislative lead. Community Redev. Agency of Los Angeles v. Abrams,
15 Cal. 3d 813, 543 P.2d 905, 126 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1975).
283. March v. Redevelopment Auth., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 212, 342 A.2d 131 (1975).

284. Redevelopment Auth. of Philadelphia Urb. Renewal Area v. Premises, 357 A.2d 246
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976).
285. Housing Auth. of Bridgeport v. Lustig, 139 Conn. 73, 90 A.2d 169 (1952). The realty
was valued at $8,309, and the business at $10,000. The trial court awarded $18,309, which
judgment was affirmed on appeal. Although this owner received a fair value for his business,
the case would have been much more satisfactory-for other displaced owners-if the Connecticut court had dealt with the issue of compensation for business losses in a straightforward
manner.
286. State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820 (Alaska 1976); City of Lansing v. Wery, 68 Mich. Ct.
App. 158, 242 N.W.2d 51 (1976); State v. Saugen, 284 Minn. 533, 169 N.W.2d 37 (1969).
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revenue and diminution of the fair market value of their property, no
compensation is due.2 87 The court held that there is no "right to continued
availability of a particular clientele that has patronized in the past the
particular commercial ventures developed by [the owners] on their property," 288 and passed the buck to the legislature to draw the balance between
individual property rights and social needs.
Where the businessman is leasing the store, he may not even share in the
award for the real estate. Boilerplate lease language covering the contingency of condemnation is widespread and at times preempts provisions of law
by which tenants, in theory, share in condemnation awards. 28 9 Where there
is no such clause in the lease awarding all condemnation damages to the
lessor, tenants have occasionally won substantial shares of the condemna290
tion award.
The success of owners in recovering damages for fixtures also varies.
First, the owner of the improvement (e.g., machinery, restaurant counters,
etc.) must prove that the item is a fixture, an undertaking more difficult than
may appear at first blush. 29 1 Fixtures are those improvements "pertaining to
the realty" (compensable); improvements considered personalty (generally
non-compensable) are to be removed by the owner for use or sale elsewhere.
In California, it has been held that the processing equipment of a plant
given over to publication of a metropolitan daily newspaper constituted an
improvement pertaining to the realty. 292 Here, some of the plant equipment
had been especially designed for, and permanently installed in, a steel and
masonry building particularly designed for the site and to accommodate the
equipment, while the rest was unconnected to the realty. The California
Supreme Court used a constructive annexation theory to find that all of the
equipment constituted fixtures, but in a later case, decided some 30 years
after Klinker, a lower appellate court refused to apply this theory to allow
compensation for items of restaurant equipment which were essential and
287. Hecton v. People, 58 Cal. App. 3d 653, 130 Cal. Rptr. 230 (1976).
288. Id. at 657-58, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
289. 2 NICHOLS. supra note 17, at §5.23[2]; United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372

(1946); Evans Prescrip. Pharmacy, Inc., v County of Ector, 535 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Civ. App.
1976). The language in Evans PrescriptionPharmacy is typical:
Having concluded that the parties in this case contracted for the termination of the
leasehold interest upon the exercise of the right of eminent domain, the lessee had no
interest which was compensable ...
535 S.W.2d at 706. Generally missing from such cases is any discussion-particularly noteworthy in the case of small businesses--of whether the lease was negotiated at arm's length among
equals or whether it was so one-sided as to amount to a contract of adhesion.
290. See, e.g., Pasadena v. Porter, 201 Cal. 381, 257 P. 526 (1927) (tenant received 54
percent of the award).
291. See, e.g., In re Lincoln-Amsterdam Urb. Renewal, 47 App. Div. 2d 735, 365 N.Y.S.2d
217 (1975) where in a taking of a warehouse subdivided into individually rentable vaults
constructed of cinder blocks, the fee interest was valued in the first stage of a bifurcated trial,
and the vaults were for some reason treated as fixtures-thereby excluded from consideration.
At the fixture trial, the court ruled that the vaults were not fixtures because they were an
inherent part of the building. Result? No award. Although this was reversed on appeal, such
"Catch-22" situations are obviously not unknown.
292. City of Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198, 25 P.2d 826 (1933).
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integral to the restaurant business (e.g., bar stools matching a counter built
into the wall).293 This court apparently disclaimed knowledge of the constructive annexation theory, for it credited the owner with advancing it. The
court reasoned that only items permanently attached to the premises by
means of cement, plaster, nails, bolts, or screws (e.g., range hoods,
restaurant counters, shelving, etc.) were fixtures, and, hence, compensable.
The result was that the owner was forced to remove the contested items at
his own expense and sell them as second-hand goods. Not surprisingly, once
the items were separated from the total restaurant operation, they suffered a
tremendous loss in value.
It is not determinative as to whether an item is a fixture that it is personal
property as between landlord and tenant. 29 4 The condemnor who tries to
evade its liability for fixtures by buying the landlord's interest and terminat-

ing the tenancy may be judicially compelled to pay for the equipment even
though the tenant would be entitled to remove it on termination of the
295
lease.
Once the owner of the improvements has satisfied the court that the
contested items are fixtures, he still must face the problem of valuation.
Here, however, our highest tribunal has provided some guidelines: the
owner of improvements with a useful life beyond the term of the lease is
entitled to what would be paid in the open market by a buyer with a
reasonable expectation that the lease would be renewed, not merely the
salvage value of the improvements. 296 It remains to be seen how the state
courts and lower federal courts will apply this rule.
This discussion of items compensable under the "just compensation"
guarantee of state and federal constitutions is by no means exhaustive. It is
intended only to point out some of the inequities faced by persons who lose
293. City of Los Angeles v. Siegel, 230 Cal. App. 2d 982, 41 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1964).
294. Concrete Serv. Co. v. State, 274 Cal. App.2d 142, 78 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1969) (concrete
batch plant consisting of buildings, garages, tanks, and equipment).
295. In Concrete Serv. Co. v. State, 274 Cal. App. 2d 142, 78 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1969), the
tenant relied on former CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1248b (superseded by CAL. CODE CiV PROC.
§1263.205), which stated that "[e]quipment designed for manufacturing or industrial purposes
and installed for use in a fixed location shall be deemed a part of the realty for the purposes of
condemnation, regardless of the method of installation." The new section applies to machinery
as well as to equipment and regardless of whether or not the improvements are used for
manufacturing or industrial purposes, thus eliminating the harsh result of City of Los Angeles
v. Siegel, 230 Cal. App. 2d 982, 41 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1964), where the furniture could not be
removed without a substantial economic loss by the owner. Legislative favoring of the
economic position of industrial or manufacturing plants while not extending the same benefits
to other business activities does not always pass judicial muster, even in the absence of
legislative changing of the groundrules. See Singer v. Oil City Redev. Auth., 437 Pa. 55, 261
A.2d 594 (1970). Some courts require a case-by-case adjudication of what items constitute
fixtures on the ground that the sole fact that machinery and equipment is installed on land or in
a structure as a necessary element of an integrated industrial operation does not require that it
be taken in an eminent domain proceeding. Masheter v. Boehm, 37 Ohio St. 2d 68, 307 N.E.2d
533 (1974).
296. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470 (1973).
Compare this result with the case of the restauranteur who received only salvage value for his
carefully selected, matched furnishings. City of Los Angeles v. Siegel, 230 Cal. App. 3d 982, 41
Cal. Rptr. 563 (1964), and text accompanying note 293 supra.
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their homes or businesses to "progress' '-generally in the guise of an urban
renewal project or a new superhighway. The harshness of the results reached
in condemnation cases has received occasional judicial recognition, but the
response of the courts is usually to claim that it is up to the respective state
legislatures to make provision for compensation of various harms 297 in spite
of the fact that determination of "just compensation" has long been held to
298
be a judicial question.
C.

The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition
Policies Act

Relocation is one of the most difficult problems confronting redevelopment agencies. Commentators have called it the "Achilles heel' '299 of urban
renewal and the most "fearful" 3°° of all urban renewal elements. Federal
legislative attempts to ameliorate the harshness of relocation began with the
Housing Act of 1949, which required localities to guarantee a
feasible method for the temporary relocation of families displaced
from the urban renewal area, and that there are or are being
provided, in the urban renewal area or in other areas not generally
less desirable in regard to public utilities and public and commercial facilities and at rents or prices within the financial means of
the families displaced from the urban renewal area, decent, safe,
and sanitary dwellings equal in number to the number of, and
available to, such displaced families and reasonably accessible to
30 1
their place of employment.
However, in spite of the seeming command of the statutory language,
prior to 1959, displaced persons received little reimbursement for loss of
personal property because the existing $100 limitation on relocation assistance barely covered moving expenses-sometimes, it did not cover even
that much. 302 The Housing Act of 1959 permitted local renewal agencies to
make relocation payments up to a maximum of $200 to a family or an
individual. However, the average payment per family was considerably
297.' But note the astute comment of the California Supreme Court in a non-condemnation
case:
There is no assurance, however, that the Legislature will undertake such a task ...
In the absence of actual or prospective legislative policy, the court is free to resolve

the case before it, and indeed must resolve it in terms of common law. (emphasis
added)

Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 868, 447 P.2d 609, 619, 73 Cal. Rptr.
369, 379 (1968).
298. See note 261 supra.

299. Millspaugh, Problems and Opportunitiesof Relocation, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 6
(1961).
300. A.A. MERMIN, RELOCATING FAMILIES: THE NEW HAVEN EXPERIENCE, 1956TO 1966,99
(1970) [hereinafter cited as MERMIN].
301. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, §105, 63 Stat. 416 (1949). The benefits of this provision

were extended to individuals by the Housing Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-560, §305 (a) (1), 78
Stat. 769 (1964).
302. MERMIN, supra note 300 at 74.

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 8
less; in fact, many families and individuals received no relocation assistance
payments at all. 3 03
In 1964, Congress mandated that a relocation program be made an
integral part of each federally-assisted urban renewal project and that information and other assistance be provided to the persons and families displaced by the project. This provision was strengthened by the Housing Act
of 1965, which required that the local redevelopment agency certify to HUD
that its original relocation plan is still valid and that adequate housing
facilities are actually available for the displaced persons. 3 Also, as part of
the Housing Act of 1964 Congress authorized a relocation adjustment
payment of up to $500 over a 12-month period for families, the elderly, and
3
handicapped individuals. 05
Congressional tinkering with the Housing Acts finally culminated in the
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act
of 1970 (Uniform Act). 30 6 The purpose of this legislation, as stated in
Section 201 of the Uniform Act, is as follows:
[t]o establish a uniform policy for the fair and equitable treatment
of persons displaced as a result of Federal and federally assisted
programs in order that such persons shall not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designed for the benefit of the
30 7
public as a whole.
Section 101 provides detailed definitions for terms used in the Uniform Act,
including the key term, "displaced person":
The term "displaced person" means any person who, on or after
the effective date of this Act, moves from real property, or moves
his personal property from real property, as a result of the acquisition of such real property, in whole or in part, or as the result of
the written order of the acquiring agency to vacate real property,
for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency, or with
308
Federal financial assistance ....
303. Martin Anderson recites that as of December 31, 1961, 112,721 families and 36,616

individuals had been displaced by urban renewal. Only 51 percent of these families and 53
percent of the individuals received relocation payments for moving expenses or property
losses. These payments averaged $71 per family and $48 per individual of those receiving
payments. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 57.

The renewal project in Boston's West End occurred in the late 1950's and only about 15
percent of the families involved received help from relocation officials. Furthermore, most
residents paid markedly increased housing costs after relocation. See text accompanying notes
91-94 supra
304. 42 U.S.C. §1455(c)(2) (1970).
305. 42 U.S.C. §1465(c)(2) (1970) (repealed, 42 U.S.C. §1465 (Supp. 111972)). While it was
in effect, this legislation went beyond the $200 per family or individual moving expense
allowance.

306. 42 U.S.C. §4601 et seq. (1970). For a thorough discussion of the benefits this Act is

supposed to provide, see Levin, DramaticNew Uniform Relocation Assistance and Acquisition
Policies, 1972 INST. ON PLAN., ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 95.

307. 42 U.S.C. §4621 (1970). Query as to whether Congress tacitly admitted that displaced
persons had suffered disproportionate injuries under prior relocation legislation.
308. 42 U.S.C. §4601(6) (1970).
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If an owner's property is taken by a redevelopment agency, but the former
owner remains in possession as a tenant of the agency because he is unable
to relocate his business in the same neighborhood and within his price range,
30 9
such a person is not "displaced" within the meaning of the statute.
However, if the person moves as a result of a notice to vacate, he is entitled
to relocation assistance benefits, regardless of whether or not the real
property is actually acquired.
A person who is displaced from a dwelling may receive a moving expense
allowance not to exceed $300, and a dislocation allowance of $200.310
Alternatively, the displaced person may choose to prove his actual expenses
and personal property losses. 3 11 Upon proper application, a displaced person
may receive payment for actual reasonable expenses in moving himself, his
family, business, farm operation or other personal property; 312 actual direct
losses of tangible personal property in moving or discontinuing a business or
farm operation, but not more than the reasonable expenses that would have
reasonable expenses in
been required to relocate such property; 31 3 and 3actual
14
searching for a replacement business or farm.
In order to qualify for these benefits, in addition to fitting the statutory
definition of a "displaced" person, it is necessary to negotiate with the
redevelopment officials and to exhaust all available administrative remedies. Owners who march into court demanding relocation benefits without
following the proper procedural path vill find they are precluded from
seeking judicial remedies. 3 15 Moreover, matters going to relocation assist3 16
ance payments will not be heard in an eminent domain proceeding.
A person who is displaced from his business or farm may, whether he
discontinues or reestablishes operations, elect to receive a fixed relocation
payment equal to the average annual net earnings of the business or farm.
However, this payment shall not be less than $2,500 or more than $10,000.
In the case of a business, a fixed payment can be made if the head of the
federal agency determines that the business cannot be relocated without a
309. Redevelopment Auth. of Philadelphia Urb. Renewal Area v. Premises, 357 A.2d 246

(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976). In a ruling based on Pennsylvania's version of the federal Relocation
Act, the court held that the former owner was not displaced because his status was changed

from an owner to a tenant. Since he had become a tenant, his right of occupancy would

eventually terminate upon expiration of his lease, not by reason of public acquisition of his
property. Therefore, he was not entitled to relocation benefits as a "displaced person."
310. 42 U.S.C. §4622(b) (1970).
311. 42 U.S.C. §4622(a) (1970).
312. 42 U.S.C. §4622(a)(1) (1970).

313. 42 U.S.C. §4622(a)(2) (1970).
314. 42 U.S.C. §4622(a)(3) (1970).
315. See, e.g. Smith v. City of Cookeville, 381 F. Supp. 100 (N.D. Tenn. 1974); Baiza v.
Southgate Rec. & Park Dist., 59 Cal. App. 3d 669, 130 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1976).
316. Community Redev. Agency of Los Angeles v. Abrams, 15 Cal. 3d 813, 543 P.2d 905,
126 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1975); Denver Urb. Renewal Auth. v. Marshall Mfg. Co., 532 P.2d 746
(Colo. App. 1976). Cf., City of Mountain View v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 72, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 358 (1975), where the condemnee was told he might seek to recover a "fixed relocation

payment" in the city's condemnation action, but must do so by way of cross-complaint seeking
administrative mandamus.
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substantial loss of its existing patronage, and the business is not a part of a
317
chain store operation.
In order to insure that a displaced homeowner is not left worse off
economically than he was before displacement, the Uniform Act provides
for an additional payment, not to exceed $15,000, to be made to any
displaced person who is displaced from a dwelling he actually owned and
occupied for at least 180 days prior to the initiation of negotiations involving
his property. This payment is to compensate for the additional cost of
procuring a comparable replacement dwelling; for increased interest costs;
and for reasonable expenses for such items as title searches, recording fees,
and closing costs incident to the purchase of the replacement dwelling. 318 To
qualify for this additional payment, the displaced person must purchase and
occupy a replacement dwelling which is judged decent, safe, and sanitary
within one year of the date on which he receives final payment of all costs of
the acquired dwelling from the federal agency or within one year of the date
319
on which he moves out of the acquired dwelling, whichever date is later.
Unfortunately, it is still too early to tell how the courts will deal with this
provision. On paper, the statutes look very good, but courts sometimes go to
great lengths to avoid compensating landowners because of fear-real or
imagined-that such depletion of the public purse will make "progress"
320
unaffordable.
This additional payment to homeowners only applies to property which is
acquired by a federal program or a federally-assisted program. However, the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974321 altered federal participation in urban redevelopment by removing federal officials from decision-making and supervisory roles. It is unclear what effect, if any, this
new legislation will have on the availability of relocation benefits under
federal legislation.
An additional problem is that, as in Yerba Buena, most of the displaced
residents are not homeowners. They are renters-eligible at most for payment of a maximum of $4,000 for no more than four years in order to rent a
comparable dwelling. 322 In Yerba Buena, very few of the residents received
even this amount. Of those who did receive relocation assistance payments,
317. 42 U.S.C. §4622(c) (1970).
318.

42 U.S.C. §4623(a)(1) (1970).

319. 42 U.S.C. §4623(a)(2) (1970).

320. See, e.g., Conrad v. Department of Nat. Resources, 30 Md. App. 479, 352 A.2d 904
(1976), where the court denied relocation assistance payments to the displaced owner on the

ingenious ground that the acquiring agency, the Maryland Department of General Services, was
neither a public nor a private agency. Also, Open Space acquisitions were held to be exempt
from the requirement for aid to the owner. Conspicuous by its absence from the opinion was
any discussion of the statutory policy, to say nothing of equal protection aspects of the law
regarding the poor owner (poorer still after this decision).
321. 42 U.S.C.A. §5301 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
322. 42 U.S.C. §4624 (1970).
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one-fifth of those interviewed stated that the payments were insufficient to
323
cover the actual amount of the rental increase.
Section 301 of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Policies Act establishes a uniform policy for the acquisition of
real property, in order to encourage and expedite acquisition with owners, to
avoid litigation and relieve court congestion, to assure consistent treatment
for owners in federal programs, and to promote public confidence in federal
land acquisition practices. 324 Nine policy provisions are established as
guidelines, including a requirement that real property be appraised before
the initiation of negotiations, and that the owner be given an opportunity to
accompany the appraiser during his inspection of the property. 325 This
seems simple enough; however, when an intrepid owner challenged the
testimony of the condemnor's appraisers as violating Section 301 of the
Uniform Act because the appraisers failed to comply with the owner's
request to attend the appraisers' inspection, the owner was told that "Section 301 is entirely exhortatory" and that his reliance on it was misplaced.326
Section 301 also requires that the head of the federal agency concerned
shall establish an amount which he believes to be just compensation for real
property to be acquired. This amount shall be established before the initiation of negotiations, and in no event shall the head of the agency attempt to
acquire the property for less than the agency's approved appraisal of the
property's fair market value. 327 Again, the language of the statute seems
reasonably clear. But Section 301 creates no rights or liabilities. 328 Therefore, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an action based on this
section if the agency offers the owners less than the fair market value of their
properties. 329 Moreover, where the state offered the owners one amount
prior to trial and the owners withdrew the money from court, the state
equivalent of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act did not prohibit the state from offering evidence of a value
lower than its own approved appraisal on which the offer was based. "The
Act is a guideline statute only, and its terms do not declare rights.' '330
It is clear even from these few examples that one must tread carefully
through the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition
Policies Act. Language that may seem clear to the layman as an unequivocal
323. See text accompanying notes 127-130 supra.
324. 42 U.S.C. §4651 (1970).
325. 42 U.S.C. §4651(2) (1970).

326. United States v. 416.81 Acres, 525 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1976).
327. 42 U.S.C. §4651(3) (1970).
328. 42 U.S.C. §4602 (1970).

329. Nall Motors, Inc. v. Iowa City, 410 F. Supp. Ill (S.D. Iowa 1975); Barnhart v.
Brinegar, 362 F. Supp. 464 (D.C. Mo. 1973).
330. State v. Swarva, 86 Wash. 2d 29, 541 P.2d 982 (1975). To the court's credit, four

justices dissented on the ground that the Act requires that the condemnor offer the owner just
compensation. Since the state had done so, the dissenters argued that the owners were entitled
to rely on the amount deposited as the proper amount.
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congressional mandate of fair and equitable treatment for condemnees loses
its clarity when viewed by members of the state and federal benches.
Although judges have historically invited legislative attempts at amelioration of the harsh results of judicially decreed eminent domain law, when the
invitation was answered, the same judges are now moving swiftly to restrict
legislatively expanded notions of benefits to be paid to owners and renters
whose property is taken for public use. Relocation assistance statutes thus
may prove to be only an illusory solution to the problem of the owner who is
called upon to contribute more than his fair share to the betterment of the
community.
Legislative attempts to help owners and renters facing displacement as a
result of takings for urban renewal, highways, and other state and federal
projects have centered on raising the amount of compensation paid to the
condemnee. However, given the courts' tendency to quickly whittle down
expanded legislative notions of proper compensation, the beleaguered property owners in reality have made fewer gains under the relocation acts than
would be apparent from a cursory reading of the statutes. The owner whose
home or business lies within the boundaries of an urban renewal project thus
has few options. He can fight the use of the urban renewal process by
political means; aroused communities have been known to defeat urban
renewal projects at the voting booth. 33 ' Unfortunately, in some localities,
referendum votes are either not possible or are only advisory. In that case,
the only political recourse is to elected officials.
A second option the owner may consider is to accept the loss of his
property and litigate over the amount of compensation if he can make a
showing that the property is worth more than the condemning agency is
willing to offer. However, if the owner wishes to retain his property and
cannot defeat the urban renewal project through the political process, he
must litigate the propriety of the taking.33 2 If the owner wins (i.e., receives
a judgment that the public entity may not take the property), he not only
keeps his property but may also recover litigation expenses (reasonable fees
331. A referendum vote on urban renewal in Fort Worth, Texas in 1966 overwhelmingly
defeated the urban renewal project slated for that city. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at xii-xv. Also,
remember Boston's North End, where the residents organized and successfully opposed an
urban renewal project in their area. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
The successful fight waged by the South of Market residents in San Francisco involved use of
both the political process and the courts.
332. It is, of course, possible to challenge a taking on the grounds that no environmental

impact report has been filed, People v. Bosio, 47 Cal. App. 3d 495, 121 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1975);
Eyde v. State, 393 Mich. 453, 225 N.W.2d 1 (1975); that the taking will invade constitutional
guarantees, e.g., Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urb. Renewal Auth., 181 Colo. 411, 509 P.2d 1250

(1973) (first amendment); that the taking is racially discriminatory, Progress Dev. Corp. v.
Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961); Boswell v. Prince George's County, 273 Md. 522, 330
A.2d 663 (1975). Takings for urban renewal may also be subject to challenges of the tax
increment financing as an illegal circumvention of constitutional requirements governing general obligation bond issues. Such challenges require special fact situations and may succeed, as in
the case of a deficient or non-existent environmental impact report, only in delaying the
implementation of the project.
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for attorneys, appraisers, and other experts necessary to defend the action as
well as court costs). 333 However, while the owner can base a challenge on
public use, he must develop a strong, persuasive argument because courts
will rarely disturb a legislative or administrative declaration that a particular
use is public.334 Judicial reluctance to overturn a finding of public use
derives, of course, from the Supreme Court's decision in Berman v.
Parker.335 In spite of Berman's legal defects, lower federal courts and most
state courts have slavishly adhered to its holding and have expanded its
reasoning to the point where the "public use" limitation has ceased to exist
as a meaningful constitutional guarantee.
D.

The Public Use DoctrineRevisited

After Berman, one must look to the amount of public benefit in determining if there is a public use. Initially, in order to have a "public use,"'
low-cost housing had to be constructed after slum areas were removed-or
at least, so went the theory. Later the principle evolved that only the taking
of the property (as distinguished from the subsequent use) need be in the
public interest.
For example, San Francisco attempted to acquire an off-street parking
garage site through the use of eminent domain. The city admitted it did not
intend to directly control rates to be charged to the garage's customers nor to
otherwise regulate the operation of the garage. The city also intended to
allow part of the ground floor frontage of the proposed garage to be leased
and occupied by retail stores. The California Supreme Court, following
Berman, held that the city could not use its general power of eminent
domain to acquire possession of land and thereafter lease the acquired
properties to private interests. 336 The California court pointed out that the
District of Columbia Redevelopment Law of 1945, challenged in Berman,
provided for a systematic plan to assure redevelopment in a manner to
protect the public health, safety, morals and welfare. Controls designed to
assure that use of the condemned property would be in the public interest
337
were found lacking in the San Francisco plan.
333. Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970,42
U.S.C. §4654(1970); Accord, CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. §1268.610. The UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN
CODE §1303, following the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act, likewise would require the

condemnor to pay the condemnee's litigation expenses in the event of a dismissal of the action

or a judgment that the condemnor lacked the right to take the subject property.
334. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 206, 436 P.2d 342, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342
(1968) (majority and dissenting opinions).
335. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
336. The Constitution does not comtemplate that the exercise of the power of eminent
domain shall secure to private activities the means to carry on a private business
whose primary objective and purpose is private gain and not public need.

City & County of San Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal. 2d 52, 59, 279 P.2d 529, 553 (1955).

337. Id. at 57, 279 P.2d at 532. Query as to how stringent the controls were in Berman. And
query again as to the validity of the California court's attempt to distinguish Berman on this

flimsy basis.
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Within a few years, the California courts lost their initial qualms about
requiring strict controls on the condemned property before it could be given
over to private, profit-making concerns. In County of Los Angeles v.
Anthony, 338 the court held that the leasing of property acquired by eminent
domain to private individuals to run a motion picture and television museum
(at a profit, naturally) does not constitute a taking for private rather than
public use. Declining to address the issue of whether or not there were
stringent controls maintained over the properties sold or leased to private
parties, the court instead quoted with approval from an earlier decision that:
[t]here have been two different interpretations of "public use" in
this country, one the broader meaning of "public utility or advantage," the other narrower one of "use, or right of use, by the
public," . . . In California our courts have followed the broader
definition of "public use" and the cases . . .have held that if
property is taken for a public use, the fact that it is later to be
returned to private ownership subject to restrictions protecting the
public use, does not make it any the less a public use. . . Once it
is determined that the taking is for a public purpose, the fact that
private persons may receive benefits is not sufficient to take away
339
from the enterprise the characteristics of a public purpose.
The court carefully refrained from discussing what, if any, restrictions were
placed on the Anthony property to protect the public use after it was returned
to private ownership. In view of the property's use for the last 12 years as a
parking lot, there would seem to be very little in the way of "restrictions
protecting the public use."
Such shenanigans are not restricted to the wild west. A vacant lot may be
condemned simply because it might some day become a slum, according to
New York's highest tribunal. 34° This opinion held that private property so
taken may be turned over to private enterprise to be developed for an
industrial park. The court reasoned that slum prevention is in the public
welfare; what is done with the property afterward is of no concern.
Shortly after it handed down this gem, the same court maintained that the
proposed New York World Trade Center was a public purpose, although
" 'portions' of structures, otherwise devoted to project purposes [are] to be
used for the production of incidental revenue. . . for the expenses of all or
part of the port development project." ' 34 1 Lest it be forgotten, this is the
338. 224 Cal. App. 2d 103, 36 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1964). See note 9 supra for the factual
background of this case.
339. Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 2d 777, 803-04, 266 P.2d 105, 122

(1954). Likewise, a mosquito abatement district may condemn land for the public use of a
"district office and corporation yard." Skreden v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 114, 126
Cal. Rptr. 411 (1975).
340. Cannata v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 210, 182 N.E.2d 395, 227 N.Y.S.2d 903

(1962). Or it may be condemned because it might one day become blighted, Free State Realty
Co., Inc. v. City of Baltimore, 32 Md. App. 11, 359 A.2d 94 (1976). See note 68 supra.
341. Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402,

227 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963). For an account of one of the portions of the structure used for
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that gave us Yonkers Community Development Agency v.
same court
Morris. 342
Nor is the middle of the country exempt from urban renewal programs
and abuses. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld the right of Illinois to seize private land and and sell part to the
University of Illinois for redevelopment as a campus and the balance to
343
private developers for redevelopment as a residential area.
A few courts have attempted to fight the onslaught. In Florida, for
example, the city decided to change the use of a block of standard property
from residential to a medically oriented use. The trial court took a dim view
of the city's attitude and denied the condemnation. On appeal, an outraged
appellate court affirmed this result:
The city planners and sociologists decided that this neighborhood
needed to be wiped out in order to provide a "cohesive" area
compatible with the existing installations. Such a conclusion is not
in this jurisdiction a basis for seizing property owned by a
3
citizen. 44
Few courts have permitted themselves such an expanded scope of review.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, however, has opposed the Berman
rationale when it comes to industrial redevelopment:
We prefer to place our answer upon consideration of the basic
purpose of the Act. This, we are compelled to find, is a private
purpose and not a public purpose under our constitution. It follows that the city may neither raise money by taxation nor acquire
property by eminent domain for such purpose. There is neither the
"public use" of taxation, nor the "public use" of eminent domain. The likelihood that public funds expended in acquisition of
property might be repaid in whole or in part, or even with a profit,
in its disposal does not alter the situation in its constitutional
aspects. The taxpayer in the operation of the plan would be, or
might be, called upon to pay therefor; and thus the constitutional
345
bar remains firm.
The Maine court was most astute in recognizing the long-range effects of
urban renewal programs; however, its view is not widely shared. Much
"production of incidental revenue.'

see Greene, The Most Spectacular Restaurant in the

World, N.Y. MAGAZINE, May 31, 1976, 43.
342. 37 N.Y.2d 478, 335 N.E.2d 327, 373 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1975). See text accompanying
notes 47-52 supra for a more detailed description of the Morris case. In a factually similar

proceeding, another owner whose land was taken in order to be conveyed to an adjoining
landowner for industrial development without open bidding was admonished that since his only
complaint was denial of the opportunity to develop the land himself, he would not be able to
contest the taking. Matter of Glen Cove Urb. Renewal Agency, 375 N.Y.S.2d 261 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1975).
343. Harrison-Halsted Community Group v. Housing & Home Fin. Agency, 310 F.2d 99
(7th Cir. 1962).
344. City of Jacksonville v. Moman, 290 So.2d 105, 107 (Fla. App. 1974).
345. Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me. 440, 445, 131 A.2d 904, 906 (1957).
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more common is the holding of a Pennsylvania court finding a proper public
purpose after listening to the City Planning Director testify that the purpose
of an urban renewal project was to achieve a higher level of commercial
346
business activity in the city's downtown area.
It is obvious that in most jurisdictions, the owner opposing the taking of
his property for an urban renewal project will have a most difficult time
challenging the taking as not being for a "public use" because it is really
being taken for the benefit of the local industrial giant, or for the latest
model shopping center, or for almost anything the city councilredevelopment agency visualizes as an aesthetic or economic asset to the
city.
CONCLUSION: A REAPPRAISAL IS DUE
At this moment, thousands and thousands of people are being
forced to leave their homes, the private property of some people is
being seized with the intention of turning it over to other people
for their personal use and private gain, thousands of homes-most
of them low-rent units-and businesses are being destroyed by the
wrecker's ball and the bulldozer, and billions of dollars of your
347
money and mine are paying for it.
In an astonishing display of judicial naivete, courts across the country
routinely declare that the "incidental" involvement of private enterprise as
the beneficiaries of urban renewal takings does not affect the constitutionality of the exercise of the eminent domain power. 34 The question that should
have been raised when the urban renewal program began in 1949 is now
long overdue: How can we as a society postulate as our goal a program
which furthers the pecuniary benefit of private redevelopers at public expense, and which is partially financed by arbitrarily inflicting uncompensated damage on fellow human beings.
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974349 eliminated the
urban renewal program. In its place, however, block grants are now provided to municipalities for locally determined community development
projects. The list of eligible activities includes acquisition, improvement
and disposition of real property, code enforcement, property demolition and
open space. In reality, the urban renewal program is merely being continued
350
under another name.
346. In re Taking in Eminent Domain, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 487, 349 A.2d 781 (1976). In
contrast to the Pennsylvania court's holding is the refusal of the California Supreme Court to
use the redevelopment process to convert a golf course into a "higher and better use" as a

shopping center. Sweetwater Valley Civic Ass'n v. City of National City, 18 Cal. 3d 270, 555
P.2d 1099, 133 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1976)
347. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at VII.
348. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954).
349. 42 U.S.C.A. §5301 et seq. (Supp. 1975).

350. "What's in a name? that which we call a rose
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Urban renewal's proponents claim that the program is in the "public
interest." Taken literally, "public interest" refers to something of benefit to
all people. Urban renewal clearly does not benefit everyone; rather, it plays
favorites, conferring wealth on some, and ruin and misery on others. It not
only allows property to be taken from one person and transferred through the
hands of a government agency to another private citizen, but accomplishes
this result at public expense 351 and without fair compensation to the victims.
The federal courts and most state courts have vied with one another in
expanding the Berman reasoning to the point where the "public use"
limitation has little meaning, if any, as a constitutional guarantee. This is
difficult to understand-to say the least-in the light of the courts' general
tendency to jealously guard their function as interpreters of the Constitution.
It requires no citation of authority to bring to mind the ongoing judicial
delimitation of legislative incursions into various Bill of Rights guarantees,
including the parameters of due process of law as it applies to claims of
deprivation of property rights. Yet, curiously, courts have plucked out of
this larger context of the Bill of Rights the constitutional term "public use"
and, as to it, have chosen a completely passive role.
Our principal criticism of the role of the judiciary in redevelopment cases
is aimed at the fact that the courts take the position that virtually the entire
responsibility of interpreting the phrase "public use" belongs to legislative
and administrative bodies. The courts reserve only the limited-and pragmatically speaking, academic-role of review on constitutional grounds if
the legislative determination of "public use" strays too far into the area of
the impossible. Cases such as Yonkers Community Development Agency v.
Morris,3 5 2 moreover, suggest that just about anything is possible. "Public
use," therefore, has become a synonym in these cases for the deliberate,
intentional sacrifice of the interests of one group of people to benefit
another-and usually smaller-group of people. Urban renewal, in a grotesque latter-day inversion of the Robin Hood principle, basically boils
down to a wealth-redistribution scheme-from the poor to the rich.
In this context, it is encouraging to note the recent decision of the
California Supreme Court in Sweetwater Valley Civic Association v. City of
National City. 353 In that case, the California high court rejected the asserted
354
legislative omnipotence to decide what constitutes blight.
By any other word would smell as sweet."
W. SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, Act II, scene 1, lines 85-86. In this case, of course,
that which we call urban renewal by any other word causes just as much misery and

destruction.

351. For discussion of lease revenue bonds and tax increment financing, see text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
352. 45 App. Div. 2d 889, 357 N.Y.S. 2d 887 (1974), aff'd, 37 N.Y.2d 478,335 N.E.2d 327,
373 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1975).
353. 18 Cal. 3d 270, 555 P.2d 1099, 133 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1976).

354. We conclude both that judicial review of the agency's and legislative body's
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The solution is that other courts also reassert their constitutional responsibility to interpret the constitutional phrase "public use." Alternatively, the
courts should follow their policy choice of non-intervention to its logical
conclusion and require the legislative bodies to face up to the economic
consequences of their own decision-making. Instead, some courts expressly
cast themselves in the role of protectors of the public purse."' As long as
this continues, hapless, hard-working citizens, innocent of any wrongdoing, will continue to be abused by their government and will have less
constitutional protection or judicial redress available than is provided by law
to other, overtly anti-social segments of society.
In the meantime, because it is deemed "natural" and desirable that
businesses expand or that cities enlarge their tax base, whole areas of cities
are torn down and redeveloped without considering the needs of the people
who live and work there. If the government were truly interested in bettering
the lot of people who must live in low-quality housing because of economic
circumstances, a far more effective method would be to increase personal
incomes and to improve housing technology so that new housing could be
built at lower costs. As for business expansions and the rebuilding of central
business districts, that should be left to the private sector. Under a free
enterprise system, private investors and developers will rebuild those areas
that are economically feasible to redevelop. Governmental intervention does
not add to the total amount of new construction; it merely affects the
location of the construction.
Urban renewal projects require long planning times, and agencies have a
tendency to force projects in areas where the market may not find it
worthwhile to build. The all-too-common result, therefore, is the long-term
existence of razed, vacant land which remains unused and off the public tax
rolls for many years.3 56 Even when the proposed improvement, such as a
shopping center, is built, the land remains off the public tax rolls for 30 or
40 years while the redevelopment agency reaps the benefits of the increase
in value (including increases due to normal appreciation), and while other,
competing businesses which do not enjoy such governmental subsidies
suffer and decline in their revenues.
finds authorized by section 33501 [CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE] is available provided it is sought within the 60-day period of section 33500 [CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY

CODE], and that the conclusive presumption of section 33368 [CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE] applies only to actions filed after the period has expired.
Sweetwater Valley Civic Ass'n v. City of National City, 18 Cal. 3d 270, 277, 555 P.2d 1099,
1103, 133 Cal. Rptr. 859, 863 (1976).
355. See, e.g., People v. Symons, 54 Cal. 2d 855, 357 P.2d 451, 9 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1960);
Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943).
356. In Los Angeles, the Bunker Hill (downtown) project began bulldozing in 1962; today,
most of the condemned land is still vacant. Likewise, Mr. Anthony's property, see note 9 supra,
remains a little-used parking lot, more than a decade after his home was razed to make way for a

mythical museum.
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In an era of ever-increasing property assessments and tax rates, 357 the
taxpayers pay twice for urban renewal projects: once in the form of higher
federal income taxes, a portion of which are then redistributed to the cities to
help finance urban renewal projects; and once in the form of higher property
taxes to compensate for the loss of the project areas from the tax rolls. The
benefits of urban renewal projects are largely illusory; such actual benefits
as do exist accrue chiefly to the urban renewal agencies-permitting them to
stay in business and operate the redevelopment cycle 58-and to the chosen
developers who receive a governmental subsidy in the operation of their
businesses.
In terms of the benefits received, the urban renewal program is not
practical. In terms of the often-and always undercompensated-human
suffering caused, the urban renewal program is not moral. No person, no
matter how poor, should be deprived of his home or his livelihood for the
aesthetic pleasure or personal gain of anyone-no matter how rich or
influential. A fortiori, such deprivation should be unthinkable without full
and fair indemnification of those in the bulldozers' path.
Another look-a cold, careful look-at urban renewal's promises and
performance is long overdue.

357. Sharply higher property assessments are the pattern over much of the United Staes in

the last year or so. The high assessments are caused by general inflation, the extra high rate of
inflation in homebuilding costs, and the bid-up in scarce prime residential lots-and the
situation isn't likely to improve in the foreseeable future. The tax-rate-the amount of tax per

unit of value-may rise in addition to the rise in assessed values, thus piling misery upon misery
for the beleaguered homeowner. Lawrence, Property Tax Pinch Felt by Many in U.S., L.A.
Times, Aug. 4, 1976, §1, at 1, col. 1.

358. For a frightening vision of the future, see the apparently serious proposal of one
former redevelopment agency director:
Cities will no longer have urban renewal projects. The city will have only one project,

which will embrace the entire city. Cities will no longer requisition funds and make

plans project by project. A city will proceed with its one large project for renewal,
and will draw down periodic payments that will apply to the entire job against a

budget that has been established for a ten- or twenty-year program.
A logical deduction from the consideration of urban renewal as a continuous

process would be that the budgeted amount for a Community Renewal Plan would

have certain characteristics of an open-end mortgage, being in effect more of a
current estimate than a limitation on expense.

Walker, A New Patternfor UrbanRenewal, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 633, 634 (1960). Come

to think about it, the future may already be upon us. In the City of Industry, there are three
redevelopment projects, which together cover most of the city which has a residential popula-

tion of 700. As noted above, see note 26 supra and accompanying text, the City of Industry

redevelopment agency was able, through a complicated refinancing plan, to free itself of a
restriction that had channeled all of its tax revenue into a fund to repay bonds. The agency can

now use the proceeds of its $84 million bond sale presumably as it wishes.
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